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ABSTRACT 
In its 2012 decision in the companion cases of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, the 
Supreme Court declared that it was unconstitutional to sentence children to mandatory life 
without parole because such sentences preclude an individualized consideration of a defendant’s 
age and other mitigating factors. What Miller did not address, however, and what has 
confounded lower courts over the last two years, is whether the ruling applies to the more than 
2,100 inmates whose convictions were already final when Miller was decided.  In all but one 
case, the question has come down to an exercise in line drawing.  If, under the Court’s elusive 
Teague retroactivity doctrine, Miller articulated a “substantive” rule of constitutional law, it is 
retroactive; if the rule is merely “procedural,” it is not.  The Supreme Court is all but certain to 
decide the issue in the near future. 
I make two primary arguments in this Article.  The first adds to the growing body of commentary 
concluding that, while Miller has “procedural” attributes, they are components of a constitutional 
mandate that is fundamentally “substantive.”  The second argument applies broadly to all new 
constitutional rules which, like the Miller rule, are grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s 
proportionality guarantee.  As even those who favor of limitations on retroactivity have 
acknowledged, there is a normative point at which interests in “finality” simply must yield to 
competing notions of justice and equality.  I argue that finality interests may be at their weakest 
when the Court announces a new proportionality rule, because the practical burdens of review and 
theoretical concerns about undermining the consequentialist goals of punishment are simply not as 
pronounced with sentences of incarceration as they are with convictions.  The risks of offending 
basic notions of “justice” may be at their most pronounced with new proportionality rules, however, 
because to deny relief to those whose sentences have been deemed “excessive” (or at a high risk of 
excessiveness) is to undermine the very principles of proportionality and fundamental fairness in 
which such rules are grounded.  Proportionality rules should therefore be afforded something close 
to a presumption of retroactivity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Quantel Lotts was fourteen years old when he was sentenced to 
life without parole.1  By any measure, Lotts’ childhood was bleak.  He 
spent the early years of his life in a blighted St. Louis neighborhood 
and lived in multiple foster homes before he was eventually placed 
with his father and younger brother.2  When Lotts was ten, his father 
married, and the three moved to rural St. Francois County, Missouri.  
By most accounts, Lotts developed a close relationship with his new 
step-brother, Michael, who was three years older.3  On November 13, 
1999, however, the boys got into an argument.  Michael hit Lotts with 
a blow dart, Lotts responded with a toy bow and arrow, and a fight 
ensued.4  Michael was stabbed and later died.5  Lotts was in seventh 
grade and not yet five feet tall when he was charged as an adult with 
first-degree murder, tried, convicted and sentenced to life without 
parole.6  Under Missouri law, his sentence was mandatory:  the 
sentencer was precluded from considering Quantel Lotts’ age and 
maturity, the events that led up to Michael’s death, Lotts’ dismal 
childhood, or the likelihood that he might one day be reformed.7  
Over the objections of Michael’s mother, Quantel Lotts was sent to 
spend the rest of his life in a Bonne Terre, Missouri prison.8 
In June 2012, the Supreme Court held in the companion cases 
Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs that sentencing those under the 
age of eighteen, like Quantel Lotts, to mandatory life without parole 
violates the Eighth Amendment because it precludes the sentencer 
from taking into account the juvenile’s age or other mitigating fac-
 
 1 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR OLD 
CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 8, 30 (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.eji.org/files/
20071017cruelandunusual.pdf. 
 2 Stephanie Chen, Teens Locked Up for Life Without a Second Chance, CNN.COM (Apr. 8, 2009), 
         http://articles.cnn.com/2009-04-08/justice/teens.life.sentence_1_parole-hearing-parole-
for-first-degree-murder-life-sentences?_s=PM:CRIME.    
 3 Id.  
 4 Ed Pilkington, Jailed for Life at Age 14: US Supreme Court To Consider Juvenile Sentences, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Mar. 19, 2012), www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/19/supreme-court-
juvenile-life-sentences. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Adam Liptak & Lisa F. Petak, Juvenile Killers in Jail for Life Seek a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/us/21juvenile.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0. 
 7 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.020 (West 2012). 
 8 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 30. 
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tors.9  Miller became the third Supreme Court decision in seven years 
to conclude that three fundamental features of youth—lack of ma-
turity, vulnerability to negative influences, and capacity for change—
make children “constitutionally different” from adults and “less de-
serving of the most severe punishments.”10  Mandatory life without 
parole for juveniles is cruel and unusual, the Court held, because “by 
making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition 
of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk 
of disproportionate punishment.”11  Though the Court declined to 
ban juvenile life without parole sentences outright, Justice Elena 
Kagan’s majority opinion makes clear that all such sentences are now 
suspect. 
What Miller did not address, however, and what has confounded 
lower courts in the months since, is whether the ruling applies to the 
more than 2,100 inmates12 who were sentenced as juveniles to manda-
tory life without parole, but whose convictions were already final 
when Miller was decided.  More than thirty lower courts13 have now 
considered the question, and while the majority of these have ruled, 
either preliminarily or finally, that Miller is retroactive, the question 
has, in all but one case, come down to an “exercise in line drawing.”14  
 
 9 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).  
For the sake of brevity, I refer to the companion cases Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. 
Hobbs as “Miller.” 
 10 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2011)).  Miller 
was preceded by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005), which abolished the 
death penalty for juveniles in 2005, and Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), which 
banned juvenile life without parole sentences for non-homicide cases in 2010. 
 11 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 12 ELIZABETH CALVIN, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHEN I DIE . . . THEY’LL SEND ME 
HOME:  YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA, AN 
UPDATE, 2 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/ sites/default/files/ reports/
crd0112 webwcover.pdf (estimating that there are currently about 2,570 youth offenders 
serving life without parole in the United States and that approximately 2,100 were sen-
tenced under mandatory statutes). 
 13 As discussed in Part II, infra, thirteen state courts have ruled on Miller’s retroactivity, with 
nine states granting and four states denying retroactive relief.  The issue is now pending 
before at least four other state courts of last resort.  The Fourt Circuit is the only federal 
appeals court to squarely decide Miller’s retroactivity, ruling that it does not apply retroac-
tively.  The Eighth Circuit is poised to rule on the issue soon as well.  In addition, six fed-
eral appeals courts have allowed habeas corpus petitions to proceed on the basis that Mil-
ler presents a prima facie case of retroactivity, while two have not.  Approximately ten 
federal district courts have ruled on the issue and are fairly evenly divided. 
 14 Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 19 (Pa. 2013) (Baer, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the process is not “a precise demarcation between rules which are innately substan-
tive versus procedural in character”). 
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If, under the Court’s beleaguered Teague v. Lane15 doctrine, Miller ar-
ticulated a “substantive” rule of constitutional law, it is retroactive; if 
the rule is “procedural,” it is not.16 
At least seven petitions for certiorari challenging state court rul-
ings on Miller’s retroactivity have been filed with the Supreme Court 
over the last fourteen months. 17  Though the first four were denied—
two from state court decisions that allowed for retroactivity and two 
from decisions that had denied it—the Court decided in December 
2014 to grant certiorari in a case brought by a Louisiana inmate. 18   
The Court was scheduled to hear argument in Toca v. Louisiana in 
March 2015, but the case was dismissed in February as moot after the 
 
 15 In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989), the Court held that the federal courts may 
not apply “new rules” of criminal procedure retroactively unless they fall into one of two 
limited exceptions:  rules that place particular conduct or classes of persons beyond the 
State’s power to punish, or those that implicate the fundamental fairness of a proceeding.  
The Court has since explained that “substantive” rules are not in fact exceptions to the 
Teague bar, they are simply “not subject to the bar.”  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 
352 n.4 (2004). 
 16 Under Teague, a rule may also be retroactive if it is a “‘watershed rule of criminal proce-
dure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”  
Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351–52 (2004) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)) 
(“[W]e give retroactive effect to only a small set of ‘watershed rules of criminal proce-
dure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”).  
This exception is extremely limited in practice, however.  To date, the Supreme Court 
has identified only one case whose rule would satisfy this standard—Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963)—which held that the Sixth Amendment requires legal representa-
tion at the public’s expense for indigent defendants.  See  Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 
417 (2004) (“This Court has yet to find a new rule that falls under this exception.  In 
providing guidance as to what might do so, the Court has repeatedly, and only, referred 
to the right-to-counsel rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, which altered the Court’s understand-
ing of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” (internal 
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).  In the Miller context, only one 
lower court has deemed Miller a “watershed rule.”  See People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d 181, 
196–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (granting petitioner the right to file a successive post-
conviction petition because Miller is a “watershed rule,” and at his pre-Miller trial, peti-
tioner had been “denied a ‘basic “precept of justice”’ by not receiving any consideration 
of his age from the circuit court in sentencing”) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463, abro-
gated by People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (holding Miller to be “a new substan-
tive rule”)).  This Article focuses on what I will call for simplicity the “substantive rule ex-
ception.” 
 17 Discussed Part II.A supra 
 18 People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 (Ill. 2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014) (denying review 
of Illinois Supreme Court’s grant of retroactive application); State v. Mantich, 543 
N.W.2d 181 (Neb. 1996), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 67  (2014) (denying review of Nebraska 
Supreme Court’s grant of retroactive application); State v. Toca, 141 So.3d 265 (La. 
2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 781 (Dec. 12, 2014); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 
A.3d 1, 5 n.7 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014) (denying review of Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court’s denial of retroactive application); State v. Tate, 111 So. 3d 1013 (La. 
2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014) (denying review of Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
denial of retroactive application). 
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state agreed to release Mr. Toca in exchange for a plea to a lesser 
charge which allowed Mr. Toca to maintain his innocence.19  Three 
other petitions are currently pending before the Court, and based on 
its decision to hear Toca, the Court seems likely to decide the issue in 
the near future. 
I make two primary arguments in this Article.  The first is doctri-
nal.  While the question of Miller’s remedial scope is plainly more 
complicated than it would have been if Miller had simply banned ju-
venile life without parole outright, the Miller rule is fundamentally 
“substantive.”  A synthesis of the Court’s decisions suggest that “sub-
stantive” rules are those that usurp the state’s authority to punish its 
citizens in some elemental way.  These include rules which modify 
state sentencing laws by altering the range of sentencing outcomes 
that a defendant may receive,20 or by making the certain facts essen-
tial to the imposition of a particular punishment.21  They also include 
rules which restrict the “class of persons” that a state law may pun-
ish,22 or proscribe a “category” of punishment for a class of individu-
als.23  In contrast, rules that require states merely to alter the method 
by which they apply a particular law are “procedural.”24  Substantive 
rules must apply retroactively, according to the Court, because they  
“‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant’ . . . faces a pun-
ishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”25 
Miller has the hallmarks of a substantive rule.  First, by stripping 
their authority to mandate life without parole for juveniles, Miller 
compelled twenty-eight states and the federal government to expand 
the range of sentencing outcomes available to juveniles convicted of 
 
 19 See Toca v. Louisiana, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 909 (Feb. 3, 2015) (dismissing certiorari under 
Supreme Court Rule 46.1); Lyle Denniston, Juvenile Sentencing Case To End, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/juvenile-sentencing-case-to-end/. 
 20 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353 (explaining that rules which define “the range of conduct . . . 
[that may be] subjected to . . . [a specific] penalty” are substantive). 
 21 Id. at 352–53 (explaining that a rule through which the Supreme Court “mak[es] a cer-
tain fact essential to the death penalty” is substantive). 
 22 Id. (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (substantive rules are those which 
prohibit “the imposition of . . . punishment on a particular class of persons”)). 
 23 Penry v. Lynuagh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (substantive rules are those that “deprive[] the State of the power to 
impose a certain penalty”). 
 24 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) (explaining that “rules that regulate only 
the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability are procedural” (emphasis in origi-
nal)). 
 25 Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (quoting Davis v. 
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974))). 
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homicide.  At least thirteen states have already done so.26  Wyoming, 
for example, has elected to abolish the punishment of juvenile life 
without parole altogether, replacing it with a range of twenty-five 
years to life with periodic review.27  Miller also imposed upon states 
new essential factors relating to a defendant’s age and life circum-
stances that sentencers must consider before sentencing a juvenile to 
life without parole.28  Hawaii, for instance, now requires sentencing 
courts to consider fifteen such factors before sentencing any juvenile 
convicted of homicide.29  Third, Miller restricted the class of individu-
als—those who may receive life without parole—to only those “rare” 
juveniles who are sufficiently culpable.30  Finally, Miller can be charac-
terized as a rule that proscribes a “category” of punishment—
mandatory life without parole—for a class of individuals—juveniles.  
Though the final outcome may be the same, mandatory life without 
parole is in important respects a qualitatively different punishment 
from discretionary life without parole.  It is the product of a con-
scious decision by lawmakers to make a harsh punishment even 
harsher by depriving defendants of any form of individualized con-
sideration and, as a result, any prospect of a lighter sentence. 
The Miller rule has done far more than alter the method by which 
states sentence juveniles; it has created a decision point where there 
was none, and, in doing so, has altered the extent to which more than 
half of the states and the federal government punish juveniles con-
victed of homicide.  While several commentators have concluded 
over the last two years that Miller applies retroactively as a “substan-
tive” rule,31 few have focused as extensively on the nature and magni-
tude of Miller’s impact on state sentencing schemes.32 
 
 26 Joshua Rovner, Slow to Act:  State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate on Life Without 
Parole, The Sentencing Project (June 2014), available at http://sentencingproject.
org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf.   
 27 H.R. HB0023, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). 
 28 Miller v. Alabama held that such a sentence can only be imposed after the sentencer has 
“take[n] into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel 
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”  132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 29 H.R. 2116, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014). 
 30 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (distinguishing between “the juvenile offender whose crime re-
flects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption”) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). 
 31 See Marsha L. Levick and Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v. Jackson:  
Obtaining Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 385–86 (2013) 
(arguing that Miller is retroactive under Teague v. Lane as a substantive rule that is categor-
ical in nature); Eric Schab, Departing from Teague:  Miller v. Alabama’s Invitation to the 
States to Experiment with New Retroactivity Standards 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 213 (2014), 
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/files/2015/01/16-Schab. 
pdf. (“[Miller], when taken together with . . . Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and J.D.B 
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The second primary argument in this Article applies broadly to all 
new constitutional rules which, like the Miller rule, are grounded in 
the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality guarantee.  As Justice John 
Harlan, one of Teague’s early architects, long ago acknowledged, 
there is a normative point at which society’s interest in preserving fi-
nal judgments simply must yield to competing notions of justice and 
equality.33  Finality interests are at their weakest when the Court an-
nounces a new Eighth Amendment proportionality rule, such as Mil-
ler’s, because neither the practical burdens of review nor theoretical 
concerns about undermining the consequentialist objectives of pun-
ishment are as pronounced with sentences of incarceration as they 
are with convictions.  Yet, the risk of offending constitutional norms 
and undermining fundamental notions of “justice” are at their most 
pronounced with new proportionality rules, because to deny relief to 
those whose sentences are “excessive” (or at high risk of excessive-
 
v. North Carolina, creates a watershed rule that ‘kids are different’ and must be treated dif-
ferently throughout the criminal trial process.”); The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Leading 
Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 276, 286 (2012) (concluding that “an implementation of proce-
dural safeguards true to Miller’s underlying premises amounts to something close to a de 
facto substantive holding”); Jason Zarrow and William Milliken, The Retroactivity of Sub-
stantive Rules to Cases on Collateral Review and the AEDPA, with a Special Focus on Miller v. Al-
abama, IND. L. REV (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2530536 (arguing Miller “has both a procedural and a substantive component,” 
and the substantive component should be applied retroactively); Molly Martinson, Note, 
Negotiating Miller Madness: Why North Carolina Gets Juvenile Resentencing Right While Other 
States Drop the Ball, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2179 (2013) (arguing that Miller represents a substan-
tive change in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and therefore, must be applied to de-
fendants whose sentences are already final); Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky:  Juvenile 
Life-Without Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 8, 
2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-without-
parole_ case_ means_courts_must_look_at_sen/ (“[T]he Miller court did more than 
change procedures; it held that the government cannot constitutionally impose a pun-
ishment.  As a substantive change in the law which puts matters outside the scope of the 
government’s power, the holding should apply retroactively.”).  Cf. Beth A. Colgan, 
Alleyne v. United States, Age as an Element, and the Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama, 61 
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 262 (2013) (“Miller’s requirement that sentencers consider age 
and its attendant consequences in cases involving juveniles—making age at the time of 
the offense a fact that triggers whether the mandatory minimum sentence of life without 
parole applies—converts age to an element of the underlying offense, rendering Miller a 
substantive rule that must be applied retroactively.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Brandon Buskey and Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over Procedure:  The Ret-
roactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 13) (arguing that Miller’s requirement that states alter the range of per-
missible sentencing outcomes and consider mitigation is substantive). 
 33 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (acknowl-
edging that “finality interests should yield” to rules which “place certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to pro-
scribe” because “there is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at 
a point where it ought properly never to repose”). 
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ness) is to subvert the very principles of proportionality and funda-
mental fairness on which such rules rest.  This may explain why the 
Supreme Court and lower courts have afforded a broader remedial 
scope to new proportionality rules than they have to new Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rules34 and suggests that 
proportionality rules may merit a presumption of retroactivity. 
In many respects, the “new” understanding of adolescence that 
underlies the Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller 
is not new at all.  Indeed, the founding of the first juvenile court 
more than a century ago was premised on the recognition that chil-
dren are inherently different from adults.  What is new, however, is 
our understanding of those biological differences between children 
and adults that make youth more impulsive, impetuous, and impres-
sionable, and, at the same time, more amenable to rehabilitation 
than adults.  This emerging body of scientific research has plainly in-
formed the Supreme Court’s establishment in Roper, Graham, and Mil-
ler of new constitutional limitations on the state’s authority to punish 
juveniles.  As this research continues to accumulate in ways that make 
adolescent differences ever more clear and particularized, the 
Court’s willingness to tolerate harsh sentences for children will fur-
ther erode and new “substantive” mandates about the limits of ado-
lescent sentencing under the Eighth Amendment are sure to emerge.  
It is almost inevitable that adolescent culpability, proportionality, and 
retroactivity will continue to collide in the years to come. 
This Article has three parts.  Part I provides requisite background.  
It first describes the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Roper v. 
Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama, which comprise the 
Court’s modern “kids are different” sentencing jurisprudence, within 
the context of the Court’s historical approach to juvenile lawbreak-
ers.  It then turns to the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence, focusing 
on the development of the substance/procedure dichotomy that has 
proven so unwieldy to lower courts in the wake of Miller.  Part II 
makes the case that, while Miller has procedural attributes, these at-
tributes are components of a broader mandate that is fundamentally 
“substantive.”  Finally, Part III claims that denying relief under Miller, 
or any such “proportionality rule,” is to privilege finality interests at 
the expense of the fundamental constitutional interests that underlie 
such rules. 
 
 34 These decisions are discussed in Part III, infra. 
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I.  MILLER AND TEAGUE COLLIDE 
With its decisions over the last decade in Roper v. Simmons, Graham 
v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court helped set the 
doctrinal stage to dial back three decades of historically unprece-
dented severity in punitive treatment of adolescent law breakers.  
What the Court did not address in any of these decisions, however, is 
whether they provide relief to those who were already serving the sen-
tences they proscribed.  The Court’s silence has proven especially 
problematic in the wake of Miller, which has the potential to affect 
more than 2,100 sentences in twenty-eight states.35  Over the last two 
years, the Court’s burgeoning “kids are different” jurisprudence has 
run head-long into the Court’s long-maligned “retroactivity” juris-
prudence, creating an analytical conundrum.  This Part describes the 
evolution of both bodies of doctrine. 
A. Kids are “Different” 
The legal notion that juveniles are “different” is not new.  Adoles-
cents have long been denied various legal privileges and afforded en-
hanced legal protections as a result of their developmental immaturi-
ty.  What has only recently emerged, however, is scientific research 
documenting the developmental and neurological differences be-
tween adolescents and adults and the Court’s recognition that “chil-
dren are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sen-
tencing.”36 
1. From Parens Patriae to Get Tough 
The legal recognition that children are developmentally different 
from adults is long-standing.  This basic premise was the impetus for 
the establishment of the first juvenile court in Chicago in 1899 and 
informed the ideological and procedural foundations of the Ameri-
can juvenile justice system.37  Nearly every component of the nascent 
juvenile system accounted for adolescents’ reduced culpability and 
greater capacity for change:  Charges against child lawbreakers were 
deemed civil rather than criminal, social workers and clinicians re-
 
 35 Marcia Coyle, States Cling to Life Sentences for Juvenile Offenders, NAT’L L. J. (June 24, 2014) 
(noting that two years after Miller was decided, less than half of the twenty-eight states af-
fected had reformed their laws). 
 36 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
 37 Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform:  A Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1229–
30 (1970). 
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placed lawyers, prosecutors, and juries,38 “crimes” were called “delin-
quent behavior,” young offenders  were adjudicated not convicted,” 
and judges issued “‘dispositions’ rather than ‘sentences.’”39  Formal 
rules were abandoned in favor of broad discretionary powers,40 which, 
it was thought, would best enable the states to carry out their role as 
“Parens Patriae.”41  As Progressive Era reformer Jane Addams observed, 
the purpose of the U.S. juvenile justice system was to “understand the 
growing child and [undertake] a sincere effort to find ways for secur-
ing his orderly development in normal society.”42 
During the mid-twentieth century, the ideals of treatment and re-
habilitation began to give way to concern over the indeterminate and 
often arbitrary nature of juvenile court sentencing.43  In response, the 
Supreme Court imported a series of key constitutional safeguards 
from the adult system during the 1960s and 1970s,44 including the 
right to counsel.45  Thus came what has been called the “second 
 
 38 See Barry Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice:  The Warren Court and the Conservative Back-
lash, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1453–56 (2003) (discussing how the Progressive Movement’s 
“new cultural conception of childhood” led to social welfare and child labor reforms to 
help address social problems, such as juvenile criminal justice). 
 39 See C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater:  Adolescent Offending and Punitive Juve-
nile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 667 n.34 (2004) (quoting DONALD T. KRAMER, 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 21.01 (2d ed. 1994)). 
 40 Id. at 668 n.43 (“Judges were given broad discretion to ‘[take] up the burden 
of parenthood and [stand] between all children and the manifest dangers 
of parental laxness and urban temptation.’”) (quoting Frederic L. Faust & 
Paul J. Brantingham, The Invention of the Juvenile Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE 
PHILOSOPHY 550–57 (1974), reprinted in ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & KELLY WEISBERG, 
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 1097 (3d ed. 1995)). 
 41 “Parens patriae” literally means “parent of the country” and, within the context of Progres-
sive Era social reforms in the United States, has been defined as “a concept of standing 
utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of 
the people, interstate water rights, general economy of the state, etc.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). 
 42 Curtis Heaston et al., Mental Health Assessment of Minors in the Juvenile Justice System, 11 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 141, 142 (2003) (quoting JANE ADDAMS, THE CHILD, THE CLINIC 
AND THE COURT (1925)). 
 43 See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE 
REPORT:  JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967) (“In theory the [juvenile] 
court’s operations could justifiably be informal, its findings and decisions made without 
observing ordinary procedural safeguards, because it would act only in the best interest of 
the child. In fact it frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive a child of liberty 
without due process of law—knowing not what else to do and needing, whether admitted-
ly or not, to act in the community’s interest even more imperatively than the child’s.”). 
 44 In 1967, for example, the Court held that the constitutional rights to notice, to counsel, 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to a fair and impartial hearing, and to protec-
tions against self-incrimination all applied equally in juvenile court.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1, 31–58 (1967). 
 45 Id. at 33–34, 41, 55, 57. 
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wave”46 of juvenile justice reform—the “constitutional domestication” 
of the juvenile court.47  These changes brought a procedural formality 
and the beginning of an ideological shift in focus from the “best in-
terests” of the child to the gravity of the offense itself. 48 
The legal distinctions between adolescent and adult lawbreakers 
gave way almost entirely during the “third wave” of reform.  With an 
abrupt rise in the rates of homicide and violent crime among juve-
niles in the late 1980s came the call for lawmakers to “get tough” on 
juvenile crime.49  Between 1992 and 1997 alone, legislatures in forty-
five states enacted or enhanced statutes that made it easier to punish 
children like adults.50  Laws like California’s Proposition 21, which 
expanded criminal court jurisdiction over juvenile offenders, trans-
ferred discretion from judges to prosecutors to determine which ju-
veniles should be tried as adults, weakened confidentiality laws, 
toughened gang laws, and expanded California’s three-strikes law for 
both juveniles and adults, proliferated.51  Adolescent offenders were 
branded juvenile “super-predators,” “morally-impoverished” youth 
who had grown up “surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal 
adults in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless set-
tings.”52  If lawmakers did not do more to incapacitate them, experts 
 
 46 GIUDI WEISS, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO REFORM STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS FOR THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE FUNDERS’ COLLABORATIVE, THE FOURTH WAVE:  JUVENILE JUSTICE 
REFORMS THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013), available at http://www. theneodifference. 
org/ wp-content/uploads/2014/09/JJ-Whitepaper-Design-Long_Final.pdf. (describing 
four “waves” of reforms over the past century). 
 47 Feld, supra note 38, at 1461. 
 48 See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS:  RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
162–65 (1999) [hereinafter FELD, BAD KIDS] (demonstrating the shift in juvenile rights 
and explaining that in that context, “procedural reforms cannot compensate for the 
highly discretionary substantive standards—‘best interests of the child’ or a ‘serious risk’ 
of future crime—that preclude evenhanded enforcement and lend themselves to discrim-
inatory applications”). 
 49 See id. at 201 (noting that the juvenile arrest rate for all violent crimes increased 67.3% 
between 1986 and 1995). 
 50 Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Re-
port, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 96 (2006), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ ojstatbb/nr2006/ down-
loads/ NR2006.pdf. 
 51 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(d) (West 2010) (dictating when a prosecutor in Cali-
fornia can try a juvenile as an adult). 
 52 John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predator, WKLY STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 25–
26, see also John DiIulio, Defining Criminality Up, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1996, at A10 (demon-
strating that inner-city children are more likely to be engaged in crime); Suzanne Fields, 
The Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at A23 (“The super-predator is upon us”); 
Gene Koprowski, The Rise of the Teen Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A17 
(explaining that “drug use and violence among ‘super-predators’ are actually caused by 
moral poverty—that is, the poverty of growing up without a loving, responsible parent 
who can teach right from wrong”).  See generally Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice:  Media, 
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predicted, 270,000 more super-predators would be on the streets by 
2010.53  “Unless we act today, we’re going to have a bloodbath when 
these kids grow up,” criminologist James Fox warned.54  Not surpris-
ingly, the number of adolescents sentenced as adults increased ab-
ruptly55 as determinate sentencing, mandatory minimum sentences, 
truth-in-sentencing laws and so-called habitual offender statutes con-
tinued to expand.56  Life sentences for both adults and juveniles also 
rose dramatically.  In 1992, about 12,500 individuals were serving sen-
tences of life without parole in the United States; by 2008, the num-
ber had increased to more than 41,000.57  More than 2,500 were juve-
niles.58 
The profile of the population of those sentenced to life without 
parole as juveniles was in many ways predictable:  more than 75% 
were youth of color,59 and according to subsequent surveys, many had 
experienced childhoods that were marked by highly elevated levels of 
poverty, abuse, exposure to community violence, familial incarcera-
tion, problems in school, engagement with delinquent peers, and 
were frequently raised in homes with few adult guardians.60  The ma-
jority of their sentences could also be tied directly to “get tough” era 
measures (most had been imposed in states where the sentences were 
mandatory, and the majority in just five states:  California, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Pennsylvania) and more than 25% of 
the life without parole sentences were imposed upon juveniles con-
victed of felony murder or accomplice liability, meaning they were 
not the primary perpetrators and, in some cases, were not even pre-
 
Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REV. 849, 851–82 (2010) (discussing the 
“superpredator” era of juvenile justice). 
 53 Former Princeton Professor John DiIulio was perhaps the most vocal of these experts, 
coining the term adolescent “superpredator” in a now famous 1995 article in The Weekly 
Standard.  JOHN J. DIIULIO, HOW TO STOP THE COMING CRIME WAVE 1 (1996), see also 
WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL, BODY COUNT:  MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN 
AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 26 (1996) (charting the projected increase in 
the United States juvenile population between 1990 and 2010). 
 54 Laurie Garrett, Murder by Teens has Soared Since ‘85, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 18, 1995. 
 55 Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers:  Findings From a National Survey, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT (March 2012), 1, 6, available at http://sentencingproject.org/ doc/publications/ 
jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf. 
 56 See MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE:  A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA, 28, 75, 77 
(2011) (discussing mandatory sentencing laws and how they bring about racial disparities 
in the prison system). 
 57 Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key:  The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences in the 
United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 27 (2010). 
 58 CALVIN, supra note 12. 
 59 Nellis, supra note 55, at 8. 
 60 Id. 
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sent.61  Despite these statistics, though the Court was willing through 
some of its decisions early in the “get tough” era to hold that age was 
a constitutionally significant mitigating factor,62 it resisted throughout 
the twentieth century the call to find juvenile sentences constitution-
ally excessive.63 
2. The Roper, Graham, and Miller Trilogy 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, crime rates among both ju-
veniles and adults had dropped to their lowest points in thirty years.64  
Concern was growing about the economic costs of incarceration,65 
and, at the same time, researchers had begun to publish studies doc-
umenting the developmental and neurological differences between 
adolescents and adults.66  A fourth “wave” of juvenile justice reforms 
 
 61 Facts about Life Without Parole for Children, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH, 
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/what-is-jlwop/ (last visited March 21, 2015). 
 62 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (affirming that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional for those under sixteen, but refusing to extend the ban to eighteen); 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822–23 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
juveniles under sixteen lacked sufficient culpability for execution); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (recognizing that “youth is more than a chronological fact” 
and “minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible 
than adults”). 
 63 See Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment:  Implications of Atkins for Executing 
and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 539, 541 (2003) (noting that “the 
Court has not set any minimum age for imposing sentences of life without parole on 
younger offenders” and that courts rarely invalidate juvenile sentences as constitutionally 
excessive). 
 64 See Jenni Gainsborough & Marc Mauer, Diminishing Returns:  Crime and Incarceration in the 
1990s, THE SENT’G PROJECT 1, 3 (2000), http://www.sentencingproject.org/ doc/File/ In-
carceration/inc_diminishingreturns.pdf (“Beginning in the early 1990s, crime rates be-
gan to decline significantly around the nation.  In the seven-year period 1991–98 the 
overall rate of crime declined by 22%, violent crime by 25%, and property crime by 
21%.”). 
 65 See, e.g., James Austin & Tony Fabelo, The Diminishing Returns of Increased Incarceration: A 
Blueprint to Improve Public Safety and Reduce Costs, THE JFA INST. July 2004, at 1, 2, 8 (ex-
plaining the negative effects that heightened incarceration is having on the economy); 
Sarah Lawrence & Jeremy Travis, The New Landscape of Imprisonment:  Mapping America’s 
Prison Expansion, URBAN INST. JUST. POL’Y CENTER 1, 1 (Apr. 2004), http://www.urban.
org/UploadedPDF/410994_mapping_prisons.pdf (emphasizing how the prison expan-
sion has impacted “state and federal funding allocations, as well as political representa-
tion”). 
 66 See, e.g., Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behavioral/Emotional 
Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 61 (2001) (differentiating between “cold cogni-
tion,” which refers to thinking under conditions of low emotion, and “hot cognition,” 
which refers to thinking under conditions of strong feelings or high arousal); L.P. Spear, 
The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & 
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS. 417, 423 (2000) (observing that “unlike adults, adolescents may 
exhibit considerably poorer cognitive performance under circumstances involving every-
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began to take hold, which were aimed at holding child lawbreakers 
accountable for their offenses in ways that were developmentally ap-
propriate.67  Amid this groundswell, the Court decided over the 
course of seven years three cases that have, in many respects, reinvig-
orated its Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence.  To put 
this in context, a brief synopsis of the Court’s approach to such pro-
portionality challenges is warranted. 
Prominent detractors notwithstanding,68 scholars and jurists gen-
erally agree that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment contains a proportionality requirement.69  For the past 
century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ban “flows 
from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime 
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense,’”70 interpret-
ing the requirement to include “not only those punishments that are 
‘barbaric’ but also those that are ‘excessive’ in relation to the crime 
and the committed.”71  Since 1910, the “precept” of proportionality 
 
day stress and time-limited situations than under optimal test conditions”); Laurence 
Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:  Psychosocial Factors in 
Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 250 (1996) (describing 
“noncognitive, psychosocial variables that influence the decision-making process” of ado-
lescents) Macarthur Foundation Research Network On Adolescent Development & Juvenile Justice, 
ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.adjj.org/downloads/ 
3030PPT-%20Adolescent% 20Development% 20and%20Criminal% 20Blameworthiness.pdf (last 
visited March 21, 2015) (describing a disjunction between youths’ cognitive ability and 
their maturity of judgment). 
 67 Issue Brief #3: Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON 
ADOLESCENT DEV. AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 1, http://www.adjj. org/downloads/ 6093issue_ 
brief_3.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). 
 68 Several Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars have argued that the Punishments 
Clause was intended to forbid only barbaric methods of punishment, not disproportion-
ate punishments.  Within the Court’s own jurisprudence, this criticism began with Justice 
White’s dissent in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 387 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).  
More than eighty years later, Justice Scalia would draw upon Justice White’s dissent in 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–85, 991–93 (1991), as well as a prominent law 
review article by Professor Anthony Granucci, to argue that the Court’s textual basis for 
proportionality review was unsupported.  Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Inflicted:”  The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 843 (1969). 
 69 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1064 
(2004) (tracing the concept of proportionality to the Magna Carta and arguing that it is 
inaccurate to base the rejection of proportionality review on history); John F. Stinneford, 
Rethinking Proportionality under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 
927, 939 (2011) (arguing that the English Bill of Rights, Anglo-American tradition, and 
the text of the “Cruel and Unusual Punishments” Clause itself all support a proportionali-
ty requirement). 
 70 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 367). 
 71 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (observing that “[r]ape is without doubt de-
serving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the 
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articulated by the Court in Weems v. United States72 has evolved into two 
distinct lines of Eighth Amendment precedent.  The first includes 
cases in which the Court has banned the death penalty for specific 
categories of offenders or offenses—“categorical” cases—while the 
second involves cases where the Court has considered whether a par-
ticular term-of-years sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to the of-
fender or offense in question—“as-applied” cases.73 
In 1977, the Court held that it was “grossly disproportionate and 
excessive punishment” to impose the death penalty for the rape of an 
adult,74 and in 2008, extended this prohibition to the rape of a 
child.75  The Court has also banned capital punishment for certain 
classes of offenders based on their cognitive status or their dimin-
ished role in the underlying offense.  In 2002, the Court deemed the 
execution of mentally retarded individuals a disproportionate pun-
ishment in Atkins, explaining that “[i]f the culpability of the average 
murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanctions availa-
ble to the state, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offend-
er surely does not merit that form of retribution.”76  For the same rea-
sons, the Court has banned capital punishment for those declared 
“insane,”77 and, in 2005, extended this rationale to juveniles under 
eighteen in Roper.78  Finally, the Court has held that the death penalty 
may not be imposed in a way that precludes the sentencer from con-
sidering as a mitigating factor “any aspect of a defendant’s character 
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the de-
 
person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjus-
tified taking of human life”). 
 72 Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. 
 73 Richard Frase, What’s “Different” (Enough) in Eighth Amendment Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J. OF 
CRIM. L. 9, 22 (2013) (differentiating between the Court’s “categorical (all-cases-of-this-
type) approach” and its “as-applied-to-these-facts approach” to proportionality review); see 
also Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death:  The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentenc-
ing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2009) (noting that in 
capital cases, “[t]he Court will scrutinize whether the death sentence is proportionate to 
the crime and the defendant, exempting certain crimes and certain offenders from a cap-
ital sentence to avoid an unconstitutionally excessive punishment”). 
 74 Coker, 433 U.S. at 598; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441–45 (striking down the punishment 
on the ground that it created “risks of overpunishment”). 
 75 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441–45. 
 76 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319–20 (2002).  The Court also noted that executing the 
mentally retarded would not “further the goal of deterrence,” because murder by those 
who are mentally debilitated is not the result of premeditation and deliberation.  Id. 
 77 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”). 
 78 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the 
Court also held that that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for those 
who were not major participants in felony murder. 
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fendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”79  This “in-
dividualization” requirement in capital cases rejects any statute that 
mandates death as a punishment for a particular offense. 
The Court takes a two-step approach to categorical challenges.  
First, the Court applies what has become known as the “evolving 
standards of decency test,” which measures a punishment’s propor-
tionality according to the “evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society,” as a threshold inquiry.80  In Atkins 
and Roper, for example, the Court found a societal consensus against 
putting mentally retarded and juvenile offenders to death.81 
The Court then turns to an “independent judgment” analysis to 
determine whether it agrees with the national consensus.  Here, the 
Court weighs the culpability of the offender or offense against the se-
verity of the punishment.  In Coker and Kennedy, for example, the 
death penalty created an unacceptable risk of disproportionality, be-
cause the Court found the offense of rape to be insufficiently severe.82  
The Court then considers whether the particular sentencing practice 
can be justified by any of the standard theories of punishment.  The 
Atkins Court, for example, stated that it was “not persuaded that the 
execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the 
deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty,”83 and in 
Roper, the Court concluded that “[o]nce the diminished culpability of 
 
 79 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).  Nor can a judge exclude 
mitigating evidence from her sentencing determination; see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 114 (1982) (“[N]either may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, 
any relevant mitigating evidence.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) 
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense [are] a constitutionally indispensable part of the 
process of inflicting the penalty of death.”). 
 80 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion).  The test has been heavily 
criticized.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword:  The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
43, 88 n.200 (1989) (“The preferences of the majority should not determine the nature 
of the [E]ighth [A]mendment or of any other constitutional right.”); Stinneford, supra 
note 69, at 905 (criticizing the test’s limited protection for criminal offenders on the 
grounds that it “rarely yields an unambiguous showing of societal consensus against a giv-
en punishment, for virtually all punishments reviewed by the Supreme Court enjoy signif-
icant public support”); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 859, 868 (2009) (noting that, if society were to pivot toward a “a large-scale 
movement toward executing juveniles or the insane,” the Court would have to deem such 
punishments proportional). 
 81 Roper, 543 U.S. at 562–63; Atkins, 536 U.S at 316. 
 82 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437–38; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 83 Atkins, 536 U.S at 321. 
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juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications 
for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”84 
Until very recently, however, the Court has taken a much different 
approach to non-capital cases, refusing to apply the robust categori-
cal analysis that it utilized in the capital context.  Instead, it has ap-
plied a “narrow” proportionality inquiry which requires the Court to 
determine only whether the sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to 
the offense.85  Under this deferential standard, as long as the state has 
a “reasonable basis for believing” that the sentence in question serves 
some penological goal, the Court will not find it grossly dispropor-
tionate and will not even turn to its inter- and intra-jurisdictional in-
quiry.86 
In 1980, in Rummel v. Estelle, the Court made clear that “death is 
different” for purposes of Eighth Amendment proportionality analy-
sis, noting that “[o]utside the context of capital punishment, success-
ful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have 
been exceedingly rare.”87  Yet, three years later, in Solem v. Helm, the 
Court unexpectedly reversed as excessive a life without parole sen-
tence for a repeat non-violent offender who had passed bad checks.88  
Reaffirming the “principle that a punishment should be proportion-
ate to the crime” as one “deeply rooted and frequently repeated in 
common-law jurisprudence,” the Court made clear that proportional-
ity review does in fact apply to term-of-years sentences. 89  Nonethe-
less, the Court refused to overrule Rummel.90 
In 1991, the Court reversed course yet again in Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, where it upheld a life without parole sentence for a first-time 
drug offender.91  In rejecting the defendant’s argument that a sen-
tence of life without parole could not be imposed without a consider-
ation of mitigating factors, the Court made clear that it would not re-
quire individualized sentencing in non-capital cases.  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Antonin Scalia also attempted to confine the Court’s 
 
 84 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 442, 445 (finding that “the death penal-
ty for child rape would not further retributive purposes” and that “punishment by death 
may not result in more deterrence or more effective enforcement”). 
 85 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998–1001 (1991) (Kennedy J., concurring) (“The 
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence.  
Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the 
crime.”). 
 86 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 87 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). 
 88 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 297–98. 
 91 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991). 
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proportionality review to capital cases, noting that the death penalty 
gives rise to “protections that the Constitution nowhere else pro-
vides.”92  Solem v. Helm was wrongly decided, Justice Scalia argued, be-
cause the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality 
guarantee.93  In his concurrence, however, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
disagreed, affirming that the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence recognizes a “narrow” proportionality requirement in non-
capital cases which “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the crime.” 94 
Harmelin signaled the Court’s apparent willingness to uphold vir-
tually any term-of-years sentence, and in its 2003 decisions in Ewing v. 
California and Lockyer v. Andrade, the Court did just that, affirming 
sentences of twenty-five years to life under California’s “Three-
Strikes” law for of a man who stole three golf clubs worth $1,200 from 
a golf pro shop and life in prison for a defendant who stole $153 
worth of videotapes from K-Mart.95  In both cases, the Court professed 
penal agnosticism, maintaining that “[s]electing the sentencing ra-
tionales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, 
not federal courts.”96 
a. Roper v. Simmons 
It was against this backdrop that the Court decided Roper v. Sim-
mons in 2005.97  Advocates had been preparing for a challenge to the 
juvenile death penalty for years, marshaling an arsenal of science and 
social science research on child development and comparative statis-
tics from the international community, which highlighted the fact 
that the United States was the only western country still putting ado-
 
 92 Id. at 994. 
 93 Id. at 965. 
 94 See id. at 997–1001 (Kennedy J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy explained: 
All of these principles—the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate 
penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that 
proportionality review be guided by objective factors—inform the final one:  The 
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and 
sentence.  Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly dispropor-
tionate” to the crime. 
  Id. at 1001. 
 95 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (plurality opinion); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 
U.S. 63 (2003). 
 96 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25. 
 97 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit the execution of a juvenile offender for commiting a capital 
crime). 
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lescents to death.98  The case of Chris Simmons, who was convicted of 
first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Missouri at age seven-
teen, proved timely.99  In the wake of the Court’s 2002 decision in At-
kins v. Virginia—that, by virtue of their diminished culpability, it was 
unconstitutional to execute “mentally retarded” offenders100—
Simmons filed for post conviction relief with the Missouri Supreme 
Court, arguing that his death sentence violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.101  The Missouri Supreme Court agreed.102 
In 2004, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.103  Simmons’ 
lawyers were joined by a cadre of amici, including the American Med-
ical Association and the American Psychiatric Association, who ar-
gued that the developmental differences between juveniles and adults 
rendered juveniles inherently less culpable and therefore less deserv-
ing of the ultimate punishment.104  The Supreme Court agreed.  Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by observing that some-
thing akin to a “national consensus” against the death penalty for 
juveniles was emerging in the United States,105 and had already 
 
 98 See, e.g., Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) in Juvenile and Criminal Justice, JUVENILE LAW 
CENTER, http://www.jlc.org/current-initiatives/promoting-fairness-courts/juvenile-life-
without-parole-jlwop (last updated Nov. 26, 2013) (“The United States is the only country 
in the world that currently sentences juveniles to life without the possibility of parole.”). 
 99 State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997) (en banc), habeas corpus granted and 
rev’d en banc sub nom. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), aff’d sub 
nom. Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
100 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07, 320–21 (2002).  Atkins overturned the Court’s 
1989 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  Penry had been decided together 
with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), a case in which the Court upheld 
capital punishment for juveniles under eighteen.  Atkins was widely viewed as a sign of the 
Court’s willingness to overturn Stanford. 
101 State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, (2005). 
102 Id. 
103 Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
104 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–71 (discussing the numerous developmental differences be-
tween juveniles and adults raised by Simmons and his amici and concluding that these 
“demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 
offenders”); Brief for Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Rop-
er, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“This Court has concluded that [] adolescents who are un-
der age 16 . . . exhibit characteristics . . . that categorically disqualify them from the death 
penalty.  Offenders at age 16 and 17 exhibit those characteristics as well.”); Brief for Am. 
Psychological Ass’n & Mo. Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“The unformed nature of adolescent character makes 
execution of 16- and 17-year-olds fall short of the purposes this Court has articulated for 
capital punishment.  Developmentally immature decision-making, paralleled by imma-
ture neurological development, diminishes an adolescent’s blameworthiness.”). 
105 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564, 568. 
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emerged in other countries.106  Then, drawing upon the same cate-
gorical analysis that it had employed in Atkins, the Court identified 
three fundamental features of youth that make juveniles constitu-
tionally different from adults for purposes of capital sentencing:  first, 
juveniles’ immaturity and limited self-control often causes them to act 
impulsively and without appreciation of the consequences of their ac-
tions, Justice Kennedy noted; second, juveniles’ increased susceptibil-
ity to peer pressure and inability to escape criminogenic environ-
ments diminishes their responsibility for unlawful behavior; and 
third, the transient nature of adolescent personality development 
means that it is harder to determine which juveniles are truly de-
praved, he concluded.107 
Justice Kennedy went on to explain that the developmental differ-
ences between juveniles and adults also diminished the penological 
justifications for imposing the death penalty.  “Retribution is not 
proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose 
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, 
by reason of youth and immaturity,” Justice Kennedy noted, and “the 
same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults 
suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”108  
In a 5-4 decision, the Court set aside Simmons’ sentence and de-
clared the death penalty unconstitutional for offenders who commit-
ted their crimes under the age of eighteen overruling Stanford v. Ken-
tucky and marking the first time that the Court had applied 
proportionality principles to juveniles as a class.109  The Court’s mod-
ern “kids are different” jurisprudence was born. 
 
106 The Court observed that only the United States and Somalia had not ratified Article 37 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which expressly prohibits capital punishment 
for crimes committed by juveniles.  Id. at 576. 
107 See id. at 569–71 (discussing these three distinctive features of adolescence).  Justice Ken-
nedy’s decision to rely on a “categorical” rather than an “as-applied” approach was met 
with considerable opposition.  In her dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor decried the 
Court’s use of a “categorical age-based rule” rather than an “individualized sentencing” 
methodology, id. at 602–03 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), while Justice Scalia argued that 
the majority’s “startling conclusion undermines the very foundations of our capital sen-
tencing system, which entrusts juries with ‘mak[ing] the difficult and uniquely human 
judgments that defy codification and that buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a 
legal system.’” Id. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
311 (1987)). 
108 Id. at 571. 
109 Id. at 578–79. 
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b. Graham v. Florida 
Just four years after Roper was decided, the Court granted certiora-
ri in Graham v. Florida.110  Graham presented a distinct but related 
question:  did the same reduced culpability that precluded the state 
from imposing the death penalty on juveniles also preclude the state 
from sentencing juveniles who had not killed to the next harshest 
punishment—life without parole?  Terrence Graham, who was sen-
tenced to life without parole for the commission of armed robbery, 
an attempted armed robbery, and a subsequent parole violation that 
occurred when he was seventeen years old,111 argued that Roper’s di-
minished culpability rationale should be extended to juveniles who 
had been sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses.  
Graham’s categorical challenge to a non-capital sentence created a 
methodological conundrum for the Court:  would the Court invoke 
the narrow, “gross disproportionality” framework that it had used in 
the past for challenges to term-of years sentences, or would it rely on 
Roper’s “categorical” ban analysis? 
Justice Kennedy again wrote for the majority, and as he had in 
Roper, began with an inquiry into the “evolving standards of decen-
cy.”112  Noting that the practice of sentencing juvenile, non-homicide 
offenders to life without parole was “exceedingly rare,”113  Justice 
Kennedy turned to the Court’s “independent judgment,” which, he 
said, required “consideration of the culpability of the offenders at is-
sue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity 
of the punishment in question.” 114  Declaring that “the concept of 
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment,” Justice Kenne-
dy went on to summarize the Court’s two distinct lines of proportion-
ality jurisprudence. 115  The first includes cases in which the Court has 
banned the death penalty for specific categories of offenders or of-
fenses—“categorical” cases—while the second involves cases where 
the Court has considered whether a particular term-of-years sentence 
is “grossly disproportionate” to the offender or offense in question—
“as-applied” cases.116  Acknowledging the difficulty of establishing a 
 
110 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
111 Id. at 2019–20. 
112 Id. at 2023 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 102 (1976)). 
113 Id. at 2026. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 2021. 
116 See Frase, supra note 73, at 9–10 (differentiating between the Court’s “categorical (all-
cases-of-this-type) approach” and its “as-applied-to-these-facts approach” to proportionali-
ty review). 
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constitutional violation under the “narrow,” non-capital approach, 
Justice Kennedy proceeded to the Court’s “categorical” prohibition 
cases.117  “The appropriate analysis is the one used in cases that in-
volved the categorical approach, specifically Atkins, Roper, and Kenne-
dy,” Justice Kennedy affirmed.118 
Justice Kennedy first revisited the three major distinguishing fea-
tures of youth that he had identified in Roper, concluding that be-
cause “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than are 
adults . . . [f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate 
the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility 
exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”119  He 
then turned to the severity of the punishment itself.  Like the death 
penalty, life without parole “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture 
that is irrevocable,” he observed.120  Finally, Justice Kennedy consid-
ered whether sentencing juveniles who had not killed to life without 
parole “serves legitimate penological goals,” and concluded that it 
did not.121  The lack of penological justification, the diminished cul-
pability of juvenile offenders, and the severity of life without parole 
sentences led Kennedy to conclude that sentencing juvenile non-
homicide offenders to life without parole is disproportionate and 
therefore barred by the Eighth Amendment.122 
If Roper was groundbreaking, Graham was seismic.  Central to Gra-
ham’s holding was the Court’s determination that juveniles are cate-
gorically less culpable than adults, doubly so when they had not 
killed, and as a result, they are categorically less deserving of the sen-
tence of life without parole—a punishment which the Court expressly 
noted in Graham, was akin to death for juveniles.123  The Court also 
 
117 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23 (“[A] threshold comparison between the severity of the 
penalty and the gravity of the crime does not advance the analysis.  Here, in addressing 
the question presented, the appropriate analysis is the one used in cases that involved the 
categorical approach . . . .”). 
118 Id. at 2023. 
119 Id. at 2026–27 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)). 
120 Id. at 2027. 
121 Id. at 2026 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–47 (2008); Roper, 543 U.S. at 
571–72; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–20 (2002)); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (con-
cluding that “penalogical theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders”). 
122 Id. at 2030. 
123 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
A young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before 
life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible individual. . . . A categorical 
rule against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders avoids the per-
verse consequence in which the lack of maturity that led to an offender’s crime is 
reinforced by the prison term. 
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explicitly dispensed with the stance of penal agnosticism that it had 
taken just seven years earlier in the companion cases of Ewing v. Cali-
fornia and Lockyer v. Andrade, in which it had affirmed that, as long as 
the state has a reasonable basis for believing that the sentence in 
question serves some penological goal, the Court would not find it 
grossly disproportionate.124  The Court pivoted abruptly in Graham, 
holding that the sentence of life without parole for juveniles convict-
ed of non-homicide offenses, like the death penalty in Atkins and Rop-
er, was disproportionate because it did not advance any legitimate 
goals of punishment. 125  Juveniles who did not kill had “twice dimin-
ished moral culpability,” Justice Kennedy noted, and none of the ra-
tionales for punishment could justify imposing upon them a sentence 
of life without parole.126  The significance of the Court’s methodolog-
ical approach was immediately evident to scholars, advocates, and ju-
rists.127  Graham had all but eviscerated the Court’s “death is different” 
approach to proportionality review.128 
In the aftermath of Graham, questions abounded about whether 
the Court was prepared to take the next logical step and ban juvenile 
life without parole outright.129  At the time, forty-two states permitted 
judges to impose life without parole sentences on juveniles convicted 
 
  Id. at 2032–33. 
124 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
125 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027–28. 
126 Id. 
127 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News—and Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54 (2010) 
(suggesting that Kennedy’s approach in Graham offered a more unified approach to pro-
portionality review than the Court’s earlier “two-track distinction between prison and 
death sentences”); Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida 
and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86 
(2010) (describing the Graham Court’s departure from prior Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence and its implications); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun 
Shine in:  The Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to 
Eighth Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79 (2010) (discussing the 
implications of the Graham decision for capital and non-capital Eighth Amendment chal-
lenges). 
128 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Clarence Thomas com-
plained that the majority’s reliance on its capital proportionality analysis “impose[s] a cat-
egorical proportionality rule banning life-without-parole sentences not just in this case, but 
in every case involving a juvenile nonhomicide offender, no matter what the circumstanc-
es.”  Id. at 2047 (emphasis in original). 
129 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: 
Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 263–64 
(2013) (discussing “how Graham altered the Court’s non-death penalty proportionality 
framework of young non-homicide offenders”). 
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of homicide,130 and in twenty-seven of these states, the sentence was 
mandatory.131  When just a year after the Court decided Graham it 
granted certiorari in the cases of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. 
Hobbs, both advocates and scholars were stunned.132 
c.  Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs 
Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson were both fourteen years old 
and accompanied by co-defendants when they committed their un-
derlying offenses.133  In July 2003, Mr. Miller and another boy assault-
ed and robbed a neighbor near Mr. Miller’s trailer home in Ala-
bama.134  The neighbor later died after the boys set fire to his house.135  
Though Alabama law required Mr. Miller to be charged as a juvenile, 
it allowed the prosecutor to seek removal of the case to adult court.136  
He did so, charging Mr. Miller as an adult with murder in the course 
of arson.137  Mr. Miller was convicted in 2006, and, under Alabama 
law, sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.138  The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals af-
firmed the conviction,139 and the Alabama Supreme Court denied re-
view. 
Mr. Jackson was with two friends in 1999 when the trio decided to 
rob a video store in Arkansas.140  Mr. Jackson waited outside and later 
entered to find one of the other boys demanding money from the 
 
130 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD 
OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/ en/ 
node/ 11578/section/2. 
131 Id. at 4. 
132 See, e.g., Scott Hechinger, Another Bite at the Graham Cracker:  The Supreme Court’s Surprise 
Revisiting of Juvenile Life Without Parole in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, GEO. L.J. 
ONLINE, http://georgetownlawjournal.org/glj-online/another-bite-at-the-graham-
cracker-the-supreme-court%E2%80%99s-surprise-revisiting-of-juvenile-life-without-parole-
in-miller-v-alabama-and-jackson-v-hobbs (last visited March 1, 2015) (“The Supreme 
Court’s decision this week to review the constitutionality of life-without-parole sentences 
imposed upon individuals convicted of homicide crimes committed at age fourteen and 
younger in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs stunned sentencing law advocates and 
Court watchers, myself included.”). 
133 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461–62 (2012). 
134 Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 683 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
135 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
136 Id. (citing Ala. Code § 12–15–34 (1977)). 
137 Id. at 2462–63. 
138 Id. at 2463. 
139 Id. at 2463. 
140 Id. at 2461. 
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store clerk.141  When the clerk threatened to call the police, the boy 
shot and killed her. 142  Mr. Jackson was convicted by an Arkansas jury 
of capital felony murder and aggravated robbery and subsequently 
sentenced to the “only one possible punishment”—mandatory life 
without parole.143  Mr. Jackson did not challenge the sentence on ap-
peal, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.144  Mr. 
Jackson then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus arguing that 
the Court’s holding in Roper v. Simmons should be extended to sen-
tences of life without parole.145  This argument was rejected.146 
In 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Mr. Jack-
son and Mr. Miller’s cases.  At the time, Mr. Miller’s case was pending 
on direct review from the Alabama Supreme Court, and Mr. Jackson’s 
case was already final.  Despite their different procedural postures, 
the Court elected to consider both cases together.  Like Graham, Mil-
ler and Jackson were framed as categorical challenges to non-capital 
sentences.147 
The cases were decided on June 25, 2012, and Justice Kagan wrote 
for the majority.  Though, in many respects, Miller picked up where 
Graham left off methodologically, Justice Kagan was not as explicit 
about the Court’s application of a “categorical” approach as Justice 
Kennedy had been in Graham.  Instead of beginning with a “national 
consensus” assessment, Justice Kagan began by reiterating Graham’s 
declaration that “proportionality is central to the Eighth Amend-
ment.”148  Miller brought together “two strands” of Eighth Amend-
ment precedent, she explained,149 and, without identifying them as 
such, promptly turned to the Court’s “categorical” ban line of cases.150  
Atkins, Kennedy, Roper, and Graham were controlling, Justice Kagan 
explained, because each case banned a category of punishment (the 
 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 2461 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(b) (1997)). 
144 Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. Hobbs, 
132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), rev’d sub nom. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455. 
145 Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Ark. 2011). 
146 Id. at 106. 
147 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Jackson, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10-9647) (“Graham 
confirmed [Jackson’s] basic submission that juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment 
without parole could maintain categorical challenges to their sentences under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–10, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 
2455 (No. 10-9646) (“[Miller] continued to raise his categorical challenge to the constitu-
tionality of sentencing a fourteen-year-old child to life imprisonment without pa-
role . . . .”). 
148 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455, 2463 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010)). 
149 Id. at 2463. 
150 Id. 
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death penalty in Atkins, Kennedy and Roper; life without parole in Gra-
ham) because either the class of defendants (mentally retarded indi-
viduals in Atkins; juveniles in Roper; and juveniles who had not killed 
in Graham) was insufficiently culpable, or the class conduct (rape of a 
child in Kennedy) was insufficiently severe.151  “By removing youth 
from the balance—by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-
parole sentence applicable to an adult—[mandatory sentencing] laws 
prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s 
harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile 
offender,” Justice Kagan concluded.152  “That contravenes Graham’s 
(and also Roper’s) foundational principle:  that imposition of a state’s 
most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though 
they were not children.”153 
The second strand of cases included those “requiring that sen-
tencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and 
the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.”154  These 
decisions were implicated, Kagan explained, because the Graham 
Court had drawn a direct comparison between life without parole for 
juveniles and the death penalty.155  While Roper, Graham, and Atkins 
focused principally on the vulnerability of the class of defendants in 
question, Woodsen, Lockett, and Eddings had focused on the severity of 
the punishment, engrafting an individualization requirement into 
capital sentencing because it is uniquely harsh.156  Because mandatory 
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles “preclude a sentencer from 
taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics 
and circumstances attendant to it,” including “immaturity, impetuos-
ity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” as well as the 
juvenile’s “family and home environment,” and the circumstances of 
 
151 Id. at 2463–65. 
152 Id. at 2466. 
153 Id. 
154 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012). 
155 Id. at 2463–64 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion)) (requiring individualized sentencing in the death penalty context); Sumner v. 
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (same); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opin-
ion) (same). 
156 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 (1976) (citing consensus of jurisdictions rejecting mandatory 
death sentences as “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid”); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (holding “the state courts must consider all relevant mitigating 
evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances”); Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 332 (1976) (noting “unacceptable severity of the common-law 
rule of automatic death sentences”). 
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the offense,157 they “pose[ ] too great a risk of disproportionate pun-
ishment,” Justice Kagan warned.158 
Though Kagan brushed rapidly past the threshold “objective indi-
cia” inquiry, she did go through the motions.159  She then considered 
and rejected each of the major penological justifications for imposing 
mandatory life without parole on juveniles.  Retribution could not 
justify the practice, because, by definition, a mandatory penalty pre-
cludes a sentencer from considering a juvenile’s diminished culpabil-
ity; deterrence was inapplicable, as it was in Roper and Graham, be-
cause the same developmental characteristics that make juveniles less 
culpable also make them less deterrable.  Incapacitation cannot justi-
fy mandatory life without parole, because juveniles cannot be said to 
be beyond repair; and rehabilitation is inapposite because life with-
out parole “foreswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”160 
Though Justice Kagan declined to ban juvenile life without parole 
sentences outright, she took pains to make clear that all such sen-
tences are now suspect.  “[G]iven all that we have said in Roper, Gra-
ham and this decision about children’s diminished culpability, and 
heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncom-
mon,” she cautioned.161 
 
157 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68. 
158 Id. at 2469. 
159 Some commentators have seen this as a signal that the Court is moving away from its “ob-
jective indicia” analysis.  See, e.g., Ian P. Farrell, Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 303 (2013), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/03/14/farrell.html (ar-
guing that Justice Kagan’s opinion in Miller suggests that the Court “may be poised to 
abandon objective indicia [when applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause]” 
in favor of a “suspect categories” approach). 
160 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
161 Id. What the Court did not articulate, however, is how legislatures, courts, and review 
boards should incorporate the mitigating qualities of youth into sentencing and release 
decisions.  Because they have been so deeply divided over Miller’s retroactivity, most state 
and federal courts have yet to address resentencing, while legislatures across the country 
are racing to amend their mandatory sentencing statutes.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 
(2013) (delineating general mitigating factors to be considered when juveniles are con-
victed of capital crimes); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.19A (West 2012) (a juvenile 
convicted of first degree felony murder shall be sentenced to “life imprisonment with pa-
role” and become eligible for parole release after a minimum of 25 years imprisonment).  
In July 2012, in an effort to avoid Miller’s resentencing quagmire altogether, Iowa Gover-
nor Terry Branstad commuted the mandatory life without parole sentences of thirty-eight 
juveniles to mandatory sixty-year prison terms. See Branstad commutes life sentences in North 
Iowa Cases, THE GLOBAL GAZETTE (July 16, 2012), available at http:// globegazette. com/ 
news/iowa/branstad-commutes-life-sentences-in-north-iowa-cases/article_14955d06-cf59-
11e1-81f2-001a4bcf887a.html. 
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Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel 
Alito all issued strong dissents, and Justice Scalia joined all three.  All 
three dissents argued that the majority’s holding had broken from 
precedent in significant respects.  “[T]he Court’s holding does not 
follow from Roper and Graham,” Chief Justice Roberts claimed blunt-
ly.162 Graham was about non-homicide offenses, Chief Justice Roberts 
maintained, and “a case that expressly puts an issue in a different cat-
egory from its own subject . . . cannot fairly be said to control that is-
sue.”163  Roper was even less helpful than Graham, Roberts reasoned, 
because it had “expressly invoke[ed] ‘special’ Eighth Amendment 
analysis for death penalty cases.”164 
Justice Thomas argued that Miller was wrongly decided, because 
the Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan had already made clear 
that mandatory life without parole was constitutional.165  In response, 
Justice Kagan revisited the Court’s conclusion in Roper and Graham 
that “kids are different” for purposes of sentencing:  “We have by now 
held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for 
adults may not be so for children. . . . So if (as Harmelin recognized) 
‘death is different,’ children are different too.”166  Justice Alito argued 
that, because multiple states allow mandatory life without parole for 
juveniles, no national consensus against it existed. 167  To this, Justice 
Kagan responded with a passage that has loomed large in the debate 
over Miller’s retroactivity:  “Our decision does not categorically bar a 
penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we 
did in Roper or Graham.  Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer fol-
low a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant 
characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.”168  The doctri-
nal implications of this passage are explored in detail in Part II.  But 
first, an overview of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence is warrant-
ed. 
B. Retroactivity, Substance, and Procedure 
The Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence has been well-
documented over the last half century in a number of excellent arti-
 
162 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2480 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
163 Id. at 2481. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 2485–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. at 2470. 
167 Id. at 2489. 
168 Id. at 2471.  The significance of this passage is discussed in Part III.C, infra. 
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cles.169  The summary provided here is condensed and focuses princi-
pally on the emergence of the Court’s decision to limit the retroac-
tive application of new rules of constitutional law to those that are 
“substantive.” 
1. Linkletter v. Walker and the Birth of “Non-Retroactivity” 
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants170 as its decisions in cases 
like Miranda v. Arizona171 and Mapp v. Ohio172 began to call into ques-
 
169 See, e.g., RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 25 (5th
 
ed. 2005); Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity:  A Cri-
tique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1565–66 (1975) (questioning the Court’s retroac-
tive approach to cases applying Miranda and Escobedo); John Blume, The Changing Face of 
Retroactivity, 58 UMKC L. REV. 581, 584–91 (1990) (analyzing the Court’s historical ap-
proach to retroactivity); David R. Dow, Teague and Death:  The Impact of Current Retroactivi-
ty Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 33–38 (1991) (discussing 
retroactivity in the Teague and Linkletter decisions); Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen 
Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, 
and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161, 190 (2005) (pointing out the 
interesting questions that arise from Teague including how the Court can determine at 
the outset whether its decision will be an application of precedent or whether it will over-
turn precedent and establish a new rule); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New 
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1738–53 (1991) 
(sketching the development of the retroactivity doctrine); James B. Haddad, Retroactivity 
Should be Rethought:  A Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY, 417, 417 (1969) (tracing the development of the retroactivity doctrine and 
concluding that the doctrine should be abandoned); Christopher Lasch, The Future of 
Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” after Danforth v. Minnesota:  Why Lower Courts 
Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction 
Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV 1, 3–4 (2009) (outlining the history of the doctrine and 
also predicting its future); Paul Mishkin, Foreword, The High Court, the Great Writ, and the 
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965) (noting the potential future im-
pact of Linkletter); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing:  The Myth of Ad-
judicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1081–1103 (1999) (analyzing the main 
question of retroactivity: “what rules should govern the transitions between legal re-
gimes”); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What 
the Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What it Might,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1677, 
1678–87 (2007) (arguing that retroactivity should not apply per se to all sentences that 
followed the federal sentencing guidelines later deemed unconstitutional by United States 
v. Booker); Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process:  A Reply to Professor 
Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 764 (1966) (arguing that both Miranda and Escobedo 
should apply retroactively); Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap:  Procedural Default as a Retroactivi-
ty Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 210–25 (1998) (laying out the history of retroactivity of the Court’s 
decisions through Teague). 
170 See e.g., William Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 
791 (2006) (discussing how the Supreme Court “constitutionalized criminal procedure” 
during the 1960s). 
171 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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tion the legitimacy of thousands of convictions.  At the same time, the 
availability of federal habeas corpus relief was expanding.  As Justice 
Lewis Powell would later comment, the Court’s 1963 decision in Fay 
v. Noia173 removed “[the] final barrier to broad collateral reexamina-
tion of state criminal convictions . . . .”174 These expansions drove the 
Court to confront for the first time how to cabin the new rules it was 
so readily promulgating.175 
The case of Linkletter v. Walker seemed to provide the ideal vehicle.  
The question in Linkletter was whether the Court’s 1961 decision in 
Mapp v. Ohio,176 which had made the exclusionary rule binding on 
state courts, would affect convictions that had become final before 
Mapp was decided.177  Concerned by the prospect of reversing “thou-
sands”178 of cases, and insisting that the Constitution was indifferent 
to the issue, the Supreme Court declared for the first time that it had 
discretion to give full or partial retroactive effect to a decision creat-
ing a new constitutional rule.179  The Court devised a three-part in-
quiry which based a rule’s remedial scope on its “prior history,” its 
“purpose and effect,” and whether retrospective application would 
“further or retard its operation.”180  Under this new test, Mapp did not 
apply retroactively, the Court concluded.181 
Linkletter sparked immediate criticism, most notably from Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Professor Paul Mishkin. Characterizing the 
decision as “basically unwise,” Mishkin criticized the Court’s apparent 
rejection of the Blackstonian “declaratory” theory of judicial review—
that courts interpret and declare the law, not create it—in favor of 
the approach endorsed by British philosopher John Austin—that 
courts may, at times, serve a legislative function.182  He argued that 
 
172 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
173 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
174 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 (1976). 
175 While “[t]here were flickers of [federal non-retroactivity earlier], . . . it was not until the 
late 1960s that these sparks found tinder.  It was then that the Court found a need to en-
gage in prospective overruling; it was then that the question of retroactivity truly 
emerged.”  Roosevelt, A Little Theory, surpra note 169 at 1089 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 275 
(1951) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
176 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657. 
177 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
178 Id. at 636. 
179 Id. at 620. 
180 Id. at 629. 
181 Id. at 640. 
182 Mishkin, supra note 169.  Several scholars have explored Mishkin’s critique in depth.  See 
Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 105, 115 
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new rules of constitutional law should be fully retroactive to cases on 
direct review, but should apply retroactively to cases on collateral re-
view only to rectify constitutional errors.183  In many respects, Mishkin 
“recast the problem from one of retroactivity versus prospectivity to 
one of the availability of habeas corpus relief.”184  Nonetheless, the 
Warren Court continued to invoke the Linkletter test to minimize the 
impact of its rights-expanding changes to the law. 185 
Two years later, in Stovall v. Denno,186 the Court somewhat modi-
fied its approach.  At issue in Stovall was whether the Court’s holdings 
in United States v. Wade187 and Gilbert v. California,188 which guaranteed 
an accused the right to counsel at any critical points of pretrial con-
frontation and required the exclusion of identification evidence that 
had been tainted by faulty procedures, applied retroactively.  The 
Court held that that decisions need not be given retroactive effect,189 
reasoning that that, though “the exclusionary rules set forth in Wade 
and Gilbert are justified by the need to assure the integrity and relia-
bility of our system of justice,” they were not indispensible to a fair 
trial. 190 
2. Justice Harlan and the Importance of Finality 
Like Linkletter v. Walker, Stovall v. Denno prompted swift criticism.  
The chief critic this time was Justice John Harlan, who began through 
several concurrences and dissents to develop his own approach to 
retroactivity.191  Justice Harlan agreed with Professor Mishkin that be-
cause pure prospectivity would violate the “case and controversy” re-
 
(2010); Blume, supra note 169; Lasch, supra note 169; Roosevelt, A Retroactivity Retrospec-
tive, supra note 169 at 1678–87. 
183 Mishkin, supra note 169, at 86–87 (describing why new rules of constitutional law should 
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review only to rectify constitutional errors). 
184 Lasch, supra note 169, at 14. 
185 See Toby Heytens, The Framework(s) of Legal Change, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 605 (2011) 
(discussing the Warren Court’s use of non-retroactivity doctrine to cabin the reach of its 
law-changing rulings in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967), United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 
U.S. 263 (1967)). 
186 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
187 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
188 388 U.S. 263 (1951). 
189 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 296. 
190 Id. at 299. 
191 See e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
Elkanich v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring); Mackey v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist v. United States, 
394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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quirement, and selective prospectivity would offend principles of 
equality, new constitutional rules should always apply to cases on di-
rect review.192  It was permissible, however, for the Court to treat cases 
on collateral review differently, he argued.193  Habeas review had al-
ways been more limited in scope than direct review, Justice Harlan 
noted, largely because of “[t]he interest in leaving concluded litiga-
tion in a state of repose.”194 
In a lengthy dissent in Mackey v. United States, Justice Harlan ex-
panded upon what he viewed as the paramount importance of “finali-
ty.”195  “Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be 
kept in plain view,” he counseled.196  “No one, not criminal defend-
ants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a 
judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but to-
morrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be 
subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.”197  In Harlan’s 
view, society’s interest in finality could outweigh even the reliability 
interest that would be served by retroactively applying constitutional 
rules “purportedly aimed at improving the factfinding process.” 198 
In support of these views, Justice Harlan drew heavily upon an in-
fluential 1963 article by Professor Paul Bator and a 1970 article by 
Judge Henry J. Friendly.  Professor Bator questioned the expansion 
of federal habeas corpus review, urging resistance to the “the im-
pulse . . . to make doubly, triply, even ultimately sure that the particu-
lar judgment is just, that the facts as found are ‘true’ and the law ap-
plied ‘correct.’”199  Bator’s opposition to relitigating federal 
constitutional questions that had already been decided by state courts 
was animated primarily by concerns about finality.  Finality, is critical 
to the “conservation of resources,” he wrote, “not only simple eco-
 
192 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “fishing one case from the 
stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional stand-
ards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by 
that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from th[e] model of judicial re-
view . . . .”). 
193 Desist, 394 U.S. at 262–63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “threat of habeas 
serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts . . . to conduct 
their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards” and 
that “[i]n order to perform this deterrence function, the habeas court need 
not . . . necessarily apply all ‘new’ constitutional rules retroactively”). 
194 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 683 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
195 Id. at 690. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 691. 
198 Id. at  694–95. 
199 See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 441, 443 (1963). 
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nomic resources, but all of the intellectual, moral, and political re-
sources involved in the legal system.”200  In a 1970 article, Judge 
Friendly took Bator’s arguments one step further, arguing that ex-
panding opportunities for collateral review would not only expend 
resources, but would also harm the criminal law’s consequentialist 
objectives.201  Justice Harlan embraced these rationales, arguing that 
this paramount interest in finality counseled a general rule of non-
retroactivity for cases pending on collateral review.202 
Justice Harlan did concede, however, that there were two excep-
tions to this general rule.  The first was for constitutional rules which 
place “certain kinds of primary private individual conduct beyond the 
power of the criminal law making authority to proscribe,” and the se-
cond, for rules that recognize a new right of procedure that is “im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty”—these should apply retroac-
tively to cases on collateral review.203  These cases “represent[] the 
clearest instance where finality interests should yield,” he noted, be-
cause “[t]here is little societal interest in permitting the criminal pro-
cess to rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose.”204 
3. Teague, Summerlin and the Substance/Procedure Dichotomy 
Nearly two decades later, the Supreme Court would adopt Justice 
Harlan’s approach.  In 1987, in Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court held 
that all new rules of constitutional law must apply retroactively to cas-
es on direct review,205 and, just a year later, in Teague v. Lane, declared 
that such rules would not apply retroactively to cases on collateral re-
view except in limited circumstances.206  Writing for a plurality of the 
Court in Teague, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor embraced Justice Har-
lan’s view that the proper focus of the retroactivity inquiry was not 
the purpose and predictability of the new rule, but rather the pur-
 
200 Id. at 451. 
201 Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 142, 146 n.15 (1970). 
202 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 688–89 (arguing that “it is sounder . . . generally to apply the law pre-
vailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of all these cases 
on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation”). 
203 Id. at 692–93. 
204 Id. at 693. 
205 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (“We therefore hold that a new rule for the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases.”). 
206 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305–14 (1988) (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
fact that life and liberty are at stake in criminal prosecutions ‘shows only that ‘conven-
tional notions of  finality’ should not have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation, 
not that they should have none.’” (emphasis in original)). 
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pose of habeas corpus in the criminal justice system.207  Agreeing with 
Justice Harlan that the role of habeas corpus was to deter misconduct 
rather than to ensure an error-free trial, Justice O’Connor main-
tained that blanket, retroactive amelioration was unnecessary to serve 
that end.208  With this in mind, and in the “interests of comity and fi-
nality,” Justice O’Connor concluded that new constitutional rules 
would not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, subject to 
two exceptions:  the first was for rules that “place[ ] ‘certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal 
law-making authority to proscribe’”;209 and the second, much narrow-
er exception was for watershed rules of criminal procedure that are 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and affect the accuracy of 
the conviction.210  The Court extended these exceptions several 
months later in Penry v. Lynaugh to include rules that “deprive[] the 
[s]tate of the power to impose a certain penalty” as well as those that 
deprive the state of the “power to punish at all.”211 
Not surprisingly, Teague came under fire almost immediately in a 
series of articles.212  Over the years, critics have assailed what they 
characterized as Teague’s self-contradictory definition of a “new 
 
207 Id. at 308. 
208 Id. at 305–07 (quoting Justice Harlan arguing that it is “sounder, in adjudicating habeas 
petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final”). 
209 Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692) (“[I]n some situations it might be that time 
and growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly de-
mand of the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock pro-
cedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.” (em-
phasis in original)).  This was subsequently found to include decisions that place a certain 
class of persons outside of a state’s power to punish;.  See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302, 339 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(urging courts to rely on the concept of “mental age” when sentencing). 
210 Teague, 489 U.S.at 311. 
211 Penry, 492 U.S. at 330, abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
212 See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner’s Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague 
v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1991); Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to its Logical Extreme: A 
Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453 (1993); John Blume & William Pratt, 
Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1990–91); Markus 
Dirk Dubber, Prudence and Substance:  How the Supreme Court’s New Habeas Retroactivity Doc-
trine Mirrors and Affects Substantive Constitutional Law, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1992); Fallon 
& Meltzer, supra note 169; Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ:  Will Death 
Sentenced Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1990–91); Marshal J. Hartman, To Be Or Not To Be A 
“New Rule”:  The Non-retroactivity of Newly Recognized Constitutional Rights After Conviction, 29 
CAL. W. L. REV. 53 (1992); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
2433 (1993); James S. Liebman, More than “Slightly Retro:”  The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of Ha-
beas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537 (1990–91) 
(presenting a version of this chapter); Recent Developments, The Court Declines in Fair-
ness—Teague v. Lane, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 164 (1990). 
964 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
rule,”213 its extraordinarily restrictive second exception for “water-
shed” rules of criminal procedure,214 and its treatment of retroactivity 
as a “threshold test.”215  Teague’s first exception—for rules that place 
certain categories of people and offenses outside the state’s power to 
punish—did not draw as much sustained attention, however, until the 
Court’s 2004 decision in Schriro v. Summerlin. 
In Summerlin, the Court was asked to determine whether its 2002 
decision in Ring v. Arizona,216 that the Sixth Amendment requires a 
jury (not a judge) to find aggravating factors necessary for imposition 
of the death penalty, applies retroactively to cases on federal habeas 
review.217  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia took the opportunity 
to recast Teague’s first exception—for rules that place certain classes 
of persons and types of conduct outside of a state’s power to pun-
ish—as an exception for “substantive” rules.218  Justice Scalia defined 
substantive rules as those that “narrow the scope of a criminal statute 
by interpreting its terms” and “place particular conduct or persons 
covered by the statute beyond the state’s power to punish.”219  They 
“generally apply retroactively,” he explained, because they “necessari-
ly carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of ‘an act 
that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the 
law cannot impose upon him.” 220 
Procedural rules are treated differently, Justice Scalia wrote, be-
cause “[t]hey do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct 
the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that 
someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have 
 
213 See, e.g., Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Para-
digm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 
N.M. L. REV. 161, 212 (2005) (“As fifteen years of Teague have taught, the new rule doc-
trine is interpreted in such an extraordinarily broad manner that it is removed from the 
traditional concerns and concepts that gave rise to retroactivity limits in general and in 
the context of habeas corpus proceedings in particular.”); Yin, supra note 169, at 287 
(“Teague and its progeny have failed to provide sufficient guidance for determining when 
a rule is new, thus leaving federal courts a zone of discretion with which they can make 
outcome determinative decisions without necessarily reaching the merits of the claims.”). 
214 See, e.g., Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, supra note 169, at 1694 (“[N]o new pro-
cedural rule has yet satisfied the Teague exception, and the Court has strongly intimated 
that none shall.”). 
215 See, e.g., Lasch, supra note 169, at 11 (citing HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 169, at § 25.4, 
1170 n.24). 
216 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). 
217 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 349 (2004). 
218 Id. at 352. 
219 Id. at 351–52. 
220 Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)). 
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been acquitted otherwise.”221  The only procedural rules that should 
apply retroactively are “‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’” 
which implicate the “fundamental fairness and accuracy of the crimi-
nal proceeding” and “without which the likelihood of an accurate 
conviction is seriously diminished.”222  Gideon v. Wainwright,223 is the 
“prototypical example” of such a rule, he noted.224  The rule articulat-
ed in Ring was merely “procedural,” Justice Scalia concluded, because 
it did not substantively modify Arizona law, but simply obligated the 
state to prove the Arizona statute’s aggravating factors to a jury.225  
“Rules that allocate decisionmaking authority,” Justice Scalia insisted, 
“are prototypical procedural rules.”226 
4. The Definition of a “Substantive” Rule 
A recent article by Jason Zarrow and William Milliken, which ex-
amines the interplay between Teague, § 2254 of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and Miller v. Alabama, makes 
the case that the Supreme Court “has acted like a common-law court” 
when it comes to retroactivity, “expanding the doctrine on a case-by-
case basis.”227  The Court’s definition of “substantive rules” is actually 
an amalgam of three to four “sub-rules,” the authors contend, which 
were promulgated by the Court in a series of decisions stretching over 
fifteen years. 
First, a rule is substantive if it places primary, private conduct be-
yond the power of the state to proscribe.228  Second, a rule is substan-
tive if it prohibits a certain category of punishment for a certain class 
of defendant because of their status or offense.229 Third, a rule is sub-
 
221 Id. at 352. 
222 Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311, 313 (1988) (plurality opinion)). 
223 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
224 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352–53 (2004) (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 
495 (1990)); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 171 n.4 (1997) (stating that Gideon is the 
“paradigmatic example” of a watershed rule); Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12 (plurality opin-
ion) (noting that the rule announced in Gideon recognized a right that is a “necessary 
condition precedent to any conviction for a serious crime”). 
225 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353. 
226 Id. 
227 Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 31, at 38. 
228 Id. at 39 (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494).  This was the entirety of the substantive-rule ex-
ception as first articulated in Teague.  See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (citing Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
An example of this type of substantive rule would be the holding of Lawrence v. Texas, 
which prohibited the criminalization of sodomy.  539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). 
229 Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 31, at 39 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 
(1989)). 
966 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
stantive if it narrows the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its 
terms230 or, fourth, modifies the elements of the offense for which the 
individual was convicted or punished.231 
Zarrow and Milliken’s approach to the “substantive” rule excep-
tion provides analytical clarity that has been largely missing from the 
academic commentary on retroactivity.  Where Zarrow and Milliken 
see four sub-rules, however, I see six. The second and fourth rules 
identified by Zarrow and Milliken can themselves be subdivided.  The 
Penry sub-rule, which defines substantive rules as those that “prohibit 
of a certain category of punishment for a certain class of defendant 
because of their status or offense,” can be further divided into those 
rules which (1) proscribe a “category” of punishment for a class of 
individuals,232 (which is what the Court did in Atkins and Roper when it 
banned the death penalty for “mentally retarded” defendants and ju-
veniles); and which (2) restrict the class of individuals who may re-
ceive a particular punishment because of their status or offense,233 
(which is what the Court did in Graham when it restricted life without 
parole to only those juveniles who committed homicide). Similarly, 
the Summerlin sub-rule—that substantive rules are those that “modify 
the elements of the offense for which the individual was convicted or 
punished”—can be divided into those which: (1) alter the range of 
sentencing outcomes that a state may impose;234 and those which (2) 
change the “essential facts” a state must consider before imposing a 
type of punishment.235  These are fine distinctions, to be sure (and 
might amount to distinctions without a difference in another con-
text), but, as Part II illustrates, these distinctions have proven critical 
as lower courts attempt to define the remedial scope of new constitu-
tional rules. 
Zarrow and Milliken also make the case that, while the substantive 
rule exception has plainly been expanded from its original scope—
which applied only to those rules that place private conduct beyond 
the state power to punish—it remains moored to its roots in the 
 
230 Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1998)). 
231 Id. (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354 (2004)). 
232 Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 (substantive rules are those that “deprive[] the State of the power 
to impose a certain penalty”). 
233 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352–53 (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495) (substantive 
rules are those which prohibit “the imposition of . . . punishment on a particular class of 
persons”). 
234 Id. At 353 (explaining that rules which define “the range of conduct . . . [that may be] 
subjected to . . . [a specific] penalty” are substantive). 
235 Id. at 352-53 (explaining that a rule through which the Supreme Court “mak[es] a certain 
fact essential to the death penalty” is substantive). 
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Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence.236  As habeas corpus relief was 
historically available for prisoners challenging the state’s jurisdiction 
to impose punishment, the substantive rule exception counsels that 
such protections ought to be available whenever the Court articulates 
new constitutional protections which substantially alter the state’s 
power to punish.  While Zarrow and Milliken insist that the “Court 
has not deviated from a categorical understanding of the substantive-
rule exception,”237 however, I argue in Part II that the substantive rule 
exception should be understood to apply more broadly to any rule 
that compels the state to alter its substantive laws in fundamental 
ways, irrespective of whether the rule bans a distinct category of pun-
ishment. 
II.  MILLER’S RETROACTIVITY 
Almost as soon as the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Miller v. 
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs on June 25, 2012, questions arose about 
the remedial scope of the ruling.  “The court did not specify whether 
the ruling was retroactive or how states should comply, and the legal 
ramifications remain unclear,” Boston Globe reporters lamented just 
hours after the decision came down.238  Over the last two years, this 
initial uncertainty has taken on a life of its own as courts, legislators, 
and advocates across the country have wrestled with the question of 
whether Miller applies retroactively to the more than 2,100 individuals 
sentenced to mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenses, but 
whose cases were final when Miller was decided.  This Part traces the 
post-Miller retroactivity litigation that has consumed and divided both 
federal and state courts for the last two and a half years.  Miller has 
“procedural attributes,” but these attributes are components of a 
broader mandate that is fundamentally “substantive” in at least two 
respects. 
A. An Exercise in “Line-Drawing” 
Since June 2012, dozens of federal and state courts have been 
asked to determine whether Miller applies retroactively to cases on 
 
236 Id. at 40, 45. 
237 Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 31, at 45 n.202 (“We use the word categorical as it is used 
in Penry—a rule is categorical if it per se prohibits a conviction or type of punishment re-
gardless of the procedures followed.”). 
238 Peter Schworm and John R. Ellement, High Court Rules Out Life Without Parole for Youths, 
BOSTON GLOBE (June 25, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/2012/06/25/juveniles/
oo7WFHAH0ltbNJAnfVdapJ/story.html. 
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collateral review.  As of the writing of this Article, thirteen state courts 
of last resort had ruled on the merits of Miller’s retroactivity.  Nine of 
these (Iowa, Mississippi, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
Texas, Wyoming, Illinois, and South Carolina) have ruled that Miller 
applies retroactively, while four (Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, 
and Michigan) have concluded that it does not.  Just one United 
States court of appeal, the Fourth Circuit, has squarely decided Mil-
ler’s retroactivity, ruling that Miller does not apply retroactively. Five 
federal appeals courts (the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Eight 
Circuits) have allowed habeas corpus petitions to proceed on the ba-
sis that Miller presents a prima facie case of retroactivity, while the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits have dismissed such petitions on the basis that 
Miller does not apply retroactively.  These decisions are laid out brief-
ly. 
In every decision issued to date, the question has, for the most 
part, come down to the court’s application of the Teague sub-
stance/procedure inquiry, albeit with varied analytics.  Those courts 
finding the Miller rule to be substantive have articulated three prima-
ry rationales.  The most widely invoked rationales rely on the Penry 
sub-rules:  that Miller is substantive because it banned a specific cate-
gory of punishment—mandatory life without parole—for a specific 
class of offenders—juveniles—because of their status.  The Supreme 
Courts of Mississippi,239 Iowa,240 Massachusetts,241 Nebraska,242 Illi-
nois,243 Texas,244 and South Carolina245 have all based their decision to 
 
239 Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013) (stating that Miller is substantive because it 
“explicitly foreclosed the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on ju-
venile offenders”). 
240 State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013) (“[Miller’s] procedural rule for a hear-
ing is the result of a substantive change in the law that prohibits mandatory life-without-
parole sentencing.  Thus, the case bars states from imposing a certain type of punishment 
on certain people.”). 
241 Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013) (finding 
Miller retroactive because it “forecloses the imposition of a certain category of punish-
ment—mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole—on a specific class of 
defendants” and because the Supreme Court retroactively applied Miller in Jackson). 
242 State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 730 (Neb. 2014) (“In essence, Miller amounts to some-
thing close to a de facto substantive holding, because it sets forth the general rule that life 
imprisonment without parole should not be imposed upon a juvenile except in the rarest 
of cases where that juvenile cannot be distinguished from an adult based on diminished 
capacity or culpability.” (internal quotations and footnotes omitted)). 
243 People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (stating that Miller is substantive because it 
“places a particular class of persons covered by the statute—juveniles—constitutionally 
beyond the State’s power to punish with a particular category of punishment—mandatory 
sentences of natural life without parole.”). 
244 Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“We conclude that [the Mil-
ler rule] is a new substantive rule that puts a juvenile’s mandatory life without parole sen-
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apply Miller retroactively on some version of this reasoning.  The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court relied on a related rationale, concluding that 
Miller was substantive because it narrowed the class of juveniles who 
can be subjected to life without parole. The court noted: 
Prior to Miller, everyone convicted of murder in Mississippi was sentenced 
to life imprisonment and was ineligible for parole.  Following Miller, Mis-
sissippi’s current sentencing and parole statutes could not be followed in 
homicide cases involving juvenile defendants.  Our sentencing scheme 
may be applied to juveniles only after applicable Miller characteristics and 
circumstances have been considered by the sentencing authority.  As 
such, Miller modified our substantive law by narrowing its application for 
juveniles.246 
The second less frequently invoked rationale is that Miller affected 
a substantive change to state sentencing laws.  The Supreme Courts 
of Wyoming247 and New Hampshire248 have relied on this argument.  
Several of these courts have also cited as supportive of their holdings 
the fact that the Supreme Court applied the Miller rule in Miller’s 
companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs.249  This was significant because un-
like Evan Miller’s case, Kuntrell Jackson’s case was on collateral rule 
review when Miller was decided.  In Diatchenko v. District Attorney for 
Suffolk County, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted: 
Our conclusion is supported by the fact that in Miller . . . the Supreme 
Court retroactively applied the rule that it was announcing in that case to 
 
tence outside the ambit of the State’s power.” (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in 
original)). 
245 Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 (2014) (holding that “[t]he [Miller] rule plainly excludes a 
certain class of defendants—juveniles—from specific punishment-life without parole ab-
sent individualized considerations of youth). 
246 Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013). 
247 State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 507 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that while Miller “certainly has a 
procedural component” it is a substantive rule because it “has effected a substantive 
change in the sentencing statutes applicable to juvenile offenders”). 
248 Petition of State of New Hampshire, 166 N.H. 659, 667–68 (2014), petition for cert. dockted 
sub nom. New Hampshire v. Michael Soto, No. 14-639 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014) (“By prohibiting 
the imposition of mandatory sentences and requiring that the sentencing authority ‘have 
the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possi-
ble penalty for juveniles,’ . . . Miller changed the permissible punishment for juveniles 
convicted of homicide.”). 
249 State v. Mantich, 287 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014) (“We also find it noteworthy that the 
Court applied the rule announced in Miller to Jackson, who was before the Court on col-
lateral review . . . . [W]e are not inclined to refuse to apply the rule announced in Miller 
to a defendant before us on collateral review when the Court has already applied the rule 
to a defendant before it on collateral review.”); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 
(Iowa 2013) (“The procedural posture of the Miller decision further supports retroactive 
application . . . . [T]he Supreme Court specifically held the new rule applied not only to 
the defendant in Miller, but also to the defendant in Jackson on collateral review . . . . 
There would have been no reason for the Court to direct such an outcome if it did not 
view the Miller rule as applying retroactively to cases on collateral review.”). 
970 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
the defendant in the companion case who was before the Court on col-
lateral review. . . . After holding that the imposition of sentence on a ju-
venile homicide offender was unconstitutional because it constituted 
“cruel and unusual punishment,” the Supreme Court applied this “new” 
rule to Jackson’s case. [Miller] at 2469, 2473–2475.  As the Court stated in 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 300, “once a new rule is applied to the defendant in 
the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be ap-
plied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”250 
Though a decision is imminent in the Eighth Circuit,251 no federal 
appeals court has yet to find Miller retroactive.  However, the United 
States Courts of Appeal for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and 
Eighth Circuits have all authorized successive habeas corpus petitions 
on the grounds that Miller either applies retroactively to cases on col-
lateral review or presents a prima facie case of retroactivity.  In each 
case, the Courts have found, in fairly perfunctory orders, that Miller 
articulated a “substantive rule.”252 
 
250 Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 655, 666–67 (Mass. 2013). 
251 Martin v. Symmes, No. 10-cv-4753, 2013 WL 5653447 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2013), appeal 
filed, No. 13-3676 (8th Cir. Dec. 12, 2013). 
252 See Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 238 (1st Cir. 2014) (“We need not answer 
[the question of whether Miller is retroactive] because the government has also conceded 
that Miller has been made retroactive, at least under the prima facie standard.”); Wang v. 
United States, No. 13-2426, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20386, at *1–2 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013) 
(granting motion to file a successive habeas corpus petition after finding that the peti-
tioner had made a successful prima facie showing that Miller is substantive and therefore 
retroactive); Stone v. United States, No. 13-1486 (2d Cir. June 7, 2013) (same); In re 
Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 283 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); In re James, No. 12-287 (4th Cir. May 
10, 2013) (same); Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720, 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (same).  
Several federal district courts have summarily concluded that the Miller rule applies retro-
actively as a new substantive rule.  See, e.g., Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, 
at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013) (holding the Miller rule is retroactive to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 plaintiffs who challenged the constitutionality of a Michigan statute that prohibits 
the Michigan parole board from considering for parole those sentenced to life in prison 
for first-degree murder).  The court noted that “if ever there was a legal rule that 
should—as a matter of law and morality—be given retroactive effect, it is the rule an-
nounced in Miller.  To hold otherwise would allow the state to impose unconstitutional 
punishment on some persons but not others, an intolerable miscarriage of justice.”  Id. at 
*2 (emphasis in original).  In a footnote, the court stated it “would find Miller retroactive 
on collateral review, because it is a new substantive rule, which ‘generally applies retroac-
tively.’” Id. at *2 n.2 (citation omitted); see also Songster v. Beard, No. 04-5916, 2014 WL 
3731459, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2014) (“[Miller] eliminated the ‘significant risk’ that a 
punishment that the law cannot impose would be imposed—a juvenile would be sen-
tenced to die in prison when he would not otherwise be sentenced because of his peculi-
ar characteristics associated with his youth.”); Flowers v. Roy, 13-cv-01508, at 13–14 (D. 
Minn. May 1, 2014) (applying Miller retroactively to case on collateral review both because 
“the Supreme Court has already made the Miller rule retroactive to cases on collateral re-
view” by granting relief in Jackson, and because “Miller is a substantive rule because it puts 
juveniles as a class beyond the reach of criminal statutes like Minn. Stat. § 609.106 . . .”); 
Alejandro v. United States, No. 13-4364, 2013 WL 4574066, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 
2013) (granting petitioner’s successive motion to set aside sentence of life imprisonment 
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By contrast, every court denying retroactive application to Miller 
has done so on the grounds that Miller is a procedural rule that does 
not rise to the level of a “watershed rule.”  In each case, courts have 
leaned heavily upon Justice Kagan’s now-well-cited assurance that 
“Miller does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or 
type of crime” but “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain 
process . . . .”253 The Supreme Courts of Minnesota,254 Louisiana,255 
Pennsylvania,256 and Michigan257 have all deemed Miller procedural on 
this basis.  
In March 2015, the Fourth Circuit became the first federal appeals 
court to rule squarely on the merits of Miller’s retroactivity.  In Johnson 
v. Ponton, the Court held that Miller was not a substantive rule because 
it did not categorically bar life without parole for juveniles, and did 
not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure.258 The 
panel also explicitly rejected the argument that the Supreme Court’s 
application of the Miller rule to Jackson was sufficient to establish its 
retroactivity.259 In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held in an unpublished opinion in 2013 that Miller was 
 
for conviction of murder in aid of racketeering and related charges committed when pe-
titioner was fifteen years old, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and concluding that Miller was 
retroactive on collateral review as a substantive rule). 
253 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012). 
254 Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328 (Minn. 2013) (reasoning that Miller is procedural 
because it did not “eliminate the power of the State to impose the punishment of life im-
prisonment without the possibility of release,” but merely mandated that “a sentencer fol-
low a certain process—considering an offenders’s youth and attendant characteristics—
before imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole”). 
255 State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 837 (La. 2013) (“[Miller] simply altered the range of per-
missible methods for determining whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life impris-
onment without parole for such a conviction, mandating only that a sentence follow a 
certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant circumstances—before 
imposing a particular penalty.”). 
256 Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013) (Miller is procedural because, 
“by its own terms, the Miller decision does not categorically bar” the sentence of life with-
out parole for juveniles). 
257 People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 711 (Mich. App. 2012) (“It is simply the manner and 
factors to be considered in the imposition of that particular sentence that Miller dictates, 
rendering the ruling procedural and not substantive in nature.”). 
258  Johnson v. Ponton, No. 13-7824, 2015 WL 924049 (4th Cir. March 5, 2015). 
259     Id. at *4. 
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not retroactive because was not a categorical rule,260 and the Eleventh 
Circuit barred a successive habeas petition on the same basis.261 
What has been apparent to jurists on both sides of the issue, how-
ever, is that the “modern application of the Teague doctrine . . . [is] 
more an exercise in (perhaps necessary) line drawing than as a pre-
cise demarcation between rules which are innately substantive versus 
procedural in character, or as an effort to address the treatment of 
the vast range of rules having both attributes in varying degrees.”262  
In all probability, it is the extreme variation in analytical approaches 
taken and outcomes reached by these lower courts that prompted the 
Court on December 12, 2014 to grant certiorari in the case of Toca v. 
Louisiana.  Mr. Toca’s petition was the fifth presented to the Court in 
the last year.  The Court had already denied two from states that had 
deemed Miller retroactive—Illinois and Nebraska—and two that had 
reached the opposite conclusion—Pennsylvania and Louisiana.263  
 
260 See Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 69128, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (“Miller does 
not satisfy the test for retroactivity because it does not categorically bar all sentences of 
life imprisonment for juveniles; Miller bars only those sentences made mandatory by a 
sentencing scheme.  Therefore, the first Teague exception does not apply.” (citations 
omitted)). 
261 In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Miller changed the procedure by 
which a sentencer may impose a sentence of life without parole on a minor by requiring 
the sentencer to take into account how children are different, and how those differences 
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.  And the Court de-
clined to consider a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least those 
14 and younger.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 
   Several federal district courts have also deemed Miller a procedural rule.  See, e.g., 
Thompson v. Roy, No. 13-cv-1524, 2014 WL 1234498, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2014) 
(“Although the issue is a close, the Court finds . . . that the new rule announced in Miller 
is procedural, not substantive.”); Sanchez v. Vargo, No. 3:13-cv-400, 2014 WL 1165862, at 
*4–6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2014) (noting the plain language of Miller indicates the Supreme 
Court intended it to be procedural); Contreras v. Davis, No. 1:13-cv-772, 2013 WL 
6504654, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Indeed, the Supreme Court’s language indi-
cates that it intended the Miller rule to be procedural, rather than substantive.” (citing 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471)); Johnson v. Ponton, No. 3:13-cv-404, 2013 WL 5663068, at *5 
(E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2013) (“The Supreme Court’s language indicates that it intended the 
Miller rule to be procedural, rather than substantive.”); Martin v. Symmes, 2013 WL 
5653447, *15 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2013) (noting that Miller could not be a substantive rule 
as that would be an extension of the Supreme Court’s holdings); Ware v. King, No. 5:12-
cv-147, 2013 WL 4777322, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2013) (“For the reasons set forth by 
the Fifth Circuit in Craig, Miller is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral re-
view.”). 
262 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 5 n.7 (Pa. 2013). 
263 See, e.g., Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014) (denying review of 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of retroactive application); State v. Tate, 111 So. 3d 
1013 (La. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014) (denying review of Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s denial of retroactive application); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 (Ill. 2014), cert. 
denied 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014) (denying review of Illinois Supreme Court’s grant of retroac-
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Toca v. Louisiana was dismissed on February 3, 2015, however, after 
Mr. Toca was released by the state of Louisiana unexpectedly after 
thirty years in prison.264  Three other petitions are currently pending 
before the Court,265 and based on its decision to hear Toca, the Court 
seems likely to decide the issue in the near future. 
B.  The Substance of Miller 
While Miller’s mandate that states engraft into their sentencing 
schemes a mechanism through which sentencers can take an individ-
ualized look at each juvenile convicted of homicide has “procedural” 
attributes, I agree with those courts and commentators who have 
concluded that Miller is a fundamentally “substantive” decision.  This 
conclusion relies on the Penry and Summerlien “sub-rules”, which 
themselves can be broken into two types.  Perhaps the stronger ar-
gument relies on Summerlin, which decision was, ironically, a non-
retroactivity decision.  In Summerlin, Justice Scalia identified what was 
ever-expanding, but nameless set of exceptions to the Teague ban and 
divided them into two categories.  The first included constitutional 
rules that require states merely to alter the method by which they apply 
a particular law, which he deemed “procedural,” and the second, 
rules which “modify the elements of an offense,” which he labeled 
“substantive.”266  Unlike procedural rules, whose purpose is to en-
hance the fairness and accuracy of state sentencing processes by re-
quiring states to shore up the methods through which they determine 
guilt and administer punishment, he implied, substantive rules do 
something more fundamental—they usurp the State’s jurisdiction 
over the substance its own laws.267 
Under Summerlin, Miller is a substantive rule because it modifies 
state sentencing laws by changing the “essential facts” a state must 
consider before imposing a sentence of life without parole,268 and by 
 
tive application); State v. Mantich, 543 N.W.2d 181 (Neb. 1996), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 67 
(2014) (denying review of Nebraska Supreme Court’s grant of retroactive application). 
264 Lyle Deniston, Juvenile Sentencing Case to End, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/juvenile-case-to-end/. 
265 State v. Montgomery, 181 So. 2d 756 (La. 1966), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Montgomery 
v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2014 WL 4441518 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2014) (filed by a pro se inmate 
in Louisiana); New Hampshire v. Soto, 34 A.3d 738 (N.H. 2011), petition for cert. docketed I 
No. 14-639 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014) (filed by the state of New Hampshire ); People v. Carp, 
828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. 2012), petition for cert. docketed sub nom. Carp v. Michigan, No. 14-
824 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2014) (filed on behalf an inmate in Michigan). 
266 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354 (2004). 
267 Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)). 
268 Id. at 352–53. 
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expanding the range of sentencing outcomes available to juveniles 
convicted of homicide.269  The other rationales, which have been in-
voked in some form by six of the nine state supreme courts to hold 
Miller retroactive, rely on the Penry sub-rules. 270  Under Penry, Miller is 
substantive both because it strips states of their authority to impose a 
distinct “category” of punishment—mandatory life without parole—
on a class of individuals, 271 and because it narrows the class of juve-
niles eligible for such punishment. 272  I address each rationale in 
turn. 
1. Modifying State Sentencing Laws 
Miller modified state sentencing laws by imposing upon states new 
factors that sentencers must consider before imposing a sentence of 
life without parole and by expanding the range of sentencing out-
comes available to juveniles convicted of homicide.  Prior to Miller, a 
juvenile convicted of homicide in states with mandatory sentencing 
provisions was not afforded any individualized consideration.  With-
out any acknowledgment of his age, role in the offense, maturity, 
mental acuity, history of trauma and abuse or family background, the 
sentencer did little more than order the juvenile to serve out the 
mandated sentence.  After Miller, before she can impose a life without 
parole sentence, state sentencers must consider factors that relate to 
the youth’s overall culpability.273  According to Miller, factors must in-
clude:  (1) the juvenile’s “chronological age” and related “immaturi-
ty, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences;” (2) 
the juvenile’s “family and home environment that surrounds him;” 
(3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent 
of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer 
pressures may have affected him;” (4) the “incompetencies associated 
with youth” in dealing with law enforcement and a criminal justice 
system designed for adults; and (5) “the possibility of rehabilita-
tion.”274  Because Miller requires the sentencer “to take into account 
how children are different, and how those differences counsel against 
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,”275 the Court has 
 
269 Id. at 353. 
270 See supra text accompanying notes 239–45. 
271 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (2002). 
272 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352–53 (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (2002)). 
273 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468–69 (2012). 
274 Id. at 2468. 
275 Id. at 2469. 
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made consideration of these factors “essential” to imposing life with-
out parole on juveniles. 
States have begun to comply with this mandate. Hawaii, for exam-
ple, now requires that a sentencing court consider the following fac-
tors when sentencing a juvenile convicted of homicide: 
(a) Age of the defendant at the time of the offense; (b) Impetuosity of 
the defendant at the time of the offense; (c) Family and community envi-
ronment of the defendant; (d) Ability of the defendant to appreciate the 
risks and consequences of the conduct; (e) Intellectual capacity of the 
defendant; (f) The outcome of any comprehensive mental health evalua-
tion conducted by an adolescent mental health professional licensed in 
the State of Hawaii; (g) Family or peer pressure on the defendant; (h) 
Level of the defendant’s participation in the offense; (i) Ability of the de-
fendant to participate meaningfully in the defendant’s defense; (j) Ca-
pacity for rehabilitation; (k) School records and any special education 
evaluations of the defendant; (l) Trauma history of the defendant; (m) 
Community involvement of the defendant; (n) Involvement in the child 
welfare system; and (o) Any other mitigating factor or circumstance the 
court deems relevant to its decision.276 
Miller has also compelled states to expand the range of sentencing 
outcomes available to juveniles convicted of homicide.  Before Miller, 
juveniles convicted of first-degree homicide in the states in question 
were given a single sentence—mandatory life without parole.  Miller 
stripped twenty-eight states and the federal government of their au-
thority to impose this sentence and required them to formulate an 
alternative range of sentences.  In the months since Miller was decid-
ed, the magnitude of this mandate has become plain.  At least thir-
teen states have now replaced their automatic first-degree murder 
sentencing provisions for juveniles with a range of alternatives. 277  
Five states have opted for an alternative sentencing range of twenty-
five years to life in prison with periodic review,278 for example.  Others 
have selected a determinate sentence of forty to life. 279  In doing so, 
states were necessarily required to consider juveniles’ reduced culpa-
bility and decide whether, given all the Supreme Court has said about 
the incomparable severity of life without parole, to continue to im-
 
276 H.R. 2116, 27th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014). 
277 Joshua Rovner, Slow to Act:  State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate on Life Without 
Parole, The Sentencing Project (June 2014), available at http://sentencingproject.org/
doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf. 
278 S. 319, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014); S. 9, 147th Gen. Assembl., Reg. Sess. (Del. 
2013); S. 5064, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014); H. 23, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 
2013); S. 635, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012). 
279 Leg. 44, 103rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013); S. 2, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013).  As I 
have argued elsewhere in this Article, many of these laws are likely to fall prey to future 
proportionality challenges based on adolescents’ diminished culpability. 
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pose discretionary life without parole sentences upon juveniles.  In 
Miller’s aftermath, at least three state legislatures have decided to 
abolish juvenile life without parole altogether.280 
In more than half of the twenty-eight affected states, Miller has al-
ready done far more than alter a single method of administering a sen-
tence; it has entirely reshaped both how and how much these states 
punish juveniles convicted of homicide.  This readily distinguishes 
Miller from the rule at issue in Summerlin.  In Summerlin, the Court 
found that the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, which held that a 
jury rather than a judge must find the aggravating factors necessary to 
impose the death penalty, was “procedural.” 281  Justice Scalia based 
this conclusion on the fact that Ring merely “allocate[d] 
decisionmaking authority” without altering state law.282  In contrast to 
Ring, however, Miller does not simply reallocate decision-making au-
thority, it creates decision-making authority where there was none.  
Miller can also be distinguished from United States v. Booker, which 
held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were not binding on 
federal courts under the Sentencing Reform Act.283  While both Booker 
and Miller restored sentencing discretion to the trial courts and in do-
ing so, expanded the range of sentences courts could impose, Miller 
did something more—it compelled states to incorporate into this new 
discretionary decision-point a series of factors that explicitly “take in-
to account how children are different, and how those differences 
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”284 
2. Narrowing the Class and Proscribing the Punishment 
Miller may also be deemed substantive because it narrowed the 
class of juveniles who may be subjected to life without parole.  Before 
Miller, every juvenile convicted of first-degree murder in states with 
such mandatory statutes was sentenced to life without parole.  Yet, 
Miller explicitly counseled that, “[b]ecause juveniles have diminished 
culpability and greater prospects for reform . . . ‘they are less deserv-
ing of the most severe punishments.’” 285 While the Court did not 
eliminate states’ authority to impose life without parole, it made clear 
 
280 H. 2116 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014); H. 23, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); S. 2, 
83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013)  
281 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353–54 (2004). 
282 Id. 
283 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
284 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
285 Id. at 2464 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)). 
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that such sentences should henceforth be “uncommon.” 286  Thus, af-
ter Miller, even discretionary life without parole sentences are suspect.  
It also stands to reason that if, as Justice Scalia maintained in 
Summerlin, a metric for substance is the relative “risk” that an offender 
is serving an unconstitutional sentence, the narrowing of this class of 
defendants by the Court to the “rare” juvenile increases the possibility 
that many of those already serving life without parole are subject to “a 
punishment that the law cannot impose upon [them].”287 
Miller also proscribes a distinct “category” of punishment for a 
class of offenders because of their status  Mandatory life without pa-
role sentences are qualitatively harsher than alternative sentencing 
schemes in which life without parole is a discretionary alternative.  As 
the Supreme Court explained in 2013 in Alleyne v. United States, 
“[m]andatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime,” 
and it is “impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing range 
from the penalty affixed to the crime.”288  “Elevating the low-end of a 
sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with the 
crime,” the Court stated.289  Mandatory life without parole for a juve-
nile is substantively harsher than a discretionary life without parole 
sentence because it forecloses the possibility that a juvenile could re-
ceive a reduced sentence.  It is also conceptually harsher.  Mandatory 
life without parole is a punishment that gained favor in the “get 
tough” era of the 1990s290 as the ultimate expression of society’s view 
that certain offenders are so culpable and irredeemable, and their of-
fenses so heinous, that they do not deserve the individualized consid-
eration normally afforded defendants in this country.  It ascended 
during the so-called super-predator era of juvenile justice—a time 
when the Progressive ideals of care and rehabilitation gave way almost 
entirely to the goal of incapacitation. 291  Other than death, there is no 
punishment more incapacitating than life without parole and no 
more inhumane way to impose it than automatically. 
This argument, of course, runs squarely into Justice Kagan’s char-
acterization of Miller as a decision that “does not categorically bar a 
penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime” and instead “requires 
 
286 Id. at 2481. 
287 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)). 
288 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2160 (2013). 
289 Id. at 2161. 
290 Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences in the 
United States, The Sentencing Project, 2010, at 27, available at http://www.
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_federalsentencingreporter.pdf. 
291 Perry Moriearty, Framing Justice:  Media, Bias and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 Md. L. Rev. 849, 
877–78 (2010). 
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only that a sentencer follow a certain process.” 292  A cynical reading of 
this passage would be that it reflects little more than the judicial bar-
tering sometimes required to attract majority support for a decision.  
But, this seems unlikely.  What makes the passage especially curious is 
that it is in direct conflict with other aspects of the decision.  Even as 
Justice Kagan assured Miller’s dissenters that Miller did not categori-
cally bar a penalty, she also took pains to craft Miller’s holding from 
the Court’s categorical and individualization proportionality juris-
prudence. 293  Unlike rules arising under other constitutional provi-
sions, which premise their prophylactic mandates on the need for ac-
curacy, reliability and fairness, Miller bases the elimination of 
mandatory life without parole for juveniles on the reduced culpability 
of adolescents as a class, the harshness and irrevocability of life with-
out parole as a category, and the fact that mandatory sentences do 
not allow decision-makers to take either of these into account. 
Two independent strands of the Court’s proportionality jurispru-
dence factor into the result.294  The first, the Roper/Graham strand, es-
tablished that juveniles are categorically different from adults and less 
deserving of harsh punishment, while the second, the 
Woodsen/Lockett/Eddings line, established that, when the most severe 
available punishments are at stake,295 the state must give individual 
defendants the opportunity to mitigate. 296  It was the “confluence” of 
the individualization cases and the categorical prohibition cases that 
drove the result.297  Were Miller only about the procedural right to in-
dividualized sentencing, Justice Kagan could have based the decision 
on the Woodsen/Lockett/Eddings line of cases alone.298  She did not do 
that.  Justice Kagan also positioned Miller as a classic proportionality 
decision in the mold of the Court’s capital jurisprudence—“a cate-
gorical, all-cases-of-this-type ruling, explicitly modeled after Graham, 
Roper, and the Court’s earlier cases imposing substantive limits on 
 
292 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455, 2459. 
293 See Part I, supra. 
294 Id. at 2463. 
295 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (citing consensus of jurisdictions rejecting 
mandatory death sentences as “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid”); Roberts v. Louisi-
ana, 428 U.S. 325, 332 (1976) (noting “unacceptable severity of the common-law rule of 
automatic death sentences”). 
296 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64. 
297 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
298 Interestingly, at least some, if not all of these individualization cases, have also been ap-
plied retroactively by lower courts. See e.g., Thigpen v. Thigpen, 541 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala. 
1989) (applying Sumner retroactively); Songer v. Wainwright, 769 F.2d 1488, 1489 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (applying Lockett retroactively). 
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death penalty eligibility.”299  As in Graham, the Court could have, but 
elected not to, apply a narrow proportionality framework,300 and in-
stead invoked the same robust proportionality review that it had used 
in its capital cases.  Though Miller’s holding—that mandatory life 
without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment—also 
draws from the Court’s “individualization” cases, it is grounded in 
concerns about juveniles’ diminished capacity and the relative harsh-
ness of mandatory life without parole. 
Miller also has other features that align it with the Court’s categor-
ical cases.  As in Roper and Graham, Justice Kagan dispensed with the 
stance of penal agnosticism the Court had so explicitly adopted in 
Ewing and Andrade.301  Though Justice Kagan refused to classify Miller 
as a retributive holding, the Court’s emphasis on reduced culpability 
suggests that it has strong retributive strains.  “Ultimately, propor-
tionality is a retributive concept, not a utilitarian one and Roper, Gra-
ham, and Miller/Jackson rest firmly on retributive grounds—reduced 
culpability—after examining and rejecting utilitarian justifications for 
punishment,” juvenile justice expert Barry Feld has argued.302 
Related to this is the Court’s apparent willingness to depart from 
the posture of legislature deference that it had taken in Harmelin and 
Ewing. Justice Kagan describes in detail the practical realities of juve-
nile justice decision-making in the modern era.303  The mechanism 
through which juveniles are transferred to adult court—a process 
once envisioned as an individualized, evidentiary hearing—is now 
legislatively mandated in many states.304  Even the discretion that ju-
 
299 See Frase, supra note 73, at 12. 
300 As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his concurrence in Graham, Terrence Graham had 
raised both a “categorical” and an “as-applied” challenge, and Chief Justice Roberts be-
lieved that the majority could have and should have chosen to rule on that basis.  Graham 
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  In Miller, without 
even identifying it as a threshold methodological choice, Justice Kagan simply launched 
into a categorical analysis. 
301 See, e.g., Smith & Cohen, supra note 127 (describing the Graham Court’s departure from 
prior Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and implications); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 
127 (discussing implications of Graham decision for capital and noncapital Eighth 
Amendment challenges). 
302 See Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount:  Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the Time, 
11 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 9, 145 (2013).  But see Frase, supra note 73, at 22 (discussing 
Graham and Miller’s non-retributive principles). 
303 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474 (2012). 
304 Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 397, 412 (2013) (citing Martha Rossiter, Comment, Transferring Children to 
Adult Criminal Court:  How to Best Protect Our Children and Society, 27 J. JUV. L. 123, 126,  
128–31 (2006) (reviewing and critiquing mandatory waiver laws)); Melissa A. Scott, 
Comment, The “Critically Important” Decision of Waiving Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:  Who 
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venile court judges have retained has “limited utility,” Kagan noted, 
because judges have incomplete and inadequate information about 
the youth before them.305  Miller and Graham represent “the Court’s 
first, tentative steps to restore some checks and balances to the [juve-
nile justice] system, much as the Court groped its way toward a simi-
lar end in its early capital-punishment cases.”306 
III. PROPORTIONALITY AND RETROACTIVITY 
Comity and federalism concerns notwithstanding,307 the primary 
rationale for denying relief to the 2,100 individuals sentenced to 
mandatory life without parole as juveniles is that preserving the finali-
ty of criminal judgments is essential to the efficiency, accuracy, legit-
imacy, and consequentialist objectives of the criminal process.308  Yet, 
as even Teague’s proponents have acknowledged, there is a normative 
point at which society’s interest in preserving final judgments simply 
must yield to competing notions of justice and equality.309  I argue 
 
Should Decide?, 50 LOY. L. REV. 711, 712, 728–29 (2004) (noting that Louisiana’s waiver 
laws are very similar to laws of other states). 
305 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474. 
306 Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 304, at 413 (citing Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
Sober Second Thoughts:  Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Pun-
ishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 364–66, 372–78 (1995) (discussing the Court’s goal of en-
suring deserved punishment in capital sentencing and its doctrinal efforts to implement 
it). 
307 Courts and scholars considering the proper scope of collateral review have long raised 
concerns about comity and federalism. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 
(2001) (explaining that the purpose of the statutory habeas bars are to “further the prin-
ciples of comity, finality, and federalism” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 
(2000)); see also Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 577–79 
(1993) (discussing how finality, comity, and federalism interests are invoked in theories 
on the proper scope of the habeas writ).  Because federalism and comity considerations 
are unique to federal habeas review of state convictions rather than state post-conviction 
proceedings, see Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279–80 (2007) (noting that “[i]f 
anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habe-
as relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague”), they are not the fo-
cus of this Article. 
308 See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Both 
the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that there will 
at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will 
ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on 
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.”); Bator, supra 
note 199, at 452 n.21 (1963) (emphasizing the importance of the finality of criminal 
judgments); Friendly, supra note 201 (citing finality concerns as a basis for limited habeas 
review). 
309 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971). (Harlan, J., dissenting) (ac-
knowledging that “finality interests should yield” to rules which “place . . . certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making author-
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that finality interests are at their weakest when the Court announces a 
new Eighth Amendment proportionality rule, such as Miller’s, be-
cause neither the practical burdens of retrial nor theoretical con-
cerns about undermining the consequentialist objectives of punish-
ment are as pronounced with sentences of incarceration as they are 
with convictions.  The risk of offending fundamental notions of “jus-
tice,” however, may be at their most pronounced with new propor-
tionality rules, because to deny relief to those whose sentences have 
been deemed “excessive” (or at high risk of excessiveness) is to un-
dermine the very principles of proportionality and fundamental fair-
ness on which such rules rest.  This may explain why the Supreme 
Court and lower courts have afforded a broader remedial scope to 
new proportionality rules than they have to new Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendment rules.310 
A.  Diminished Finality Concerns 
In Mackey v. United States, Justice Harlan worried that reviewing 
cases on collateral review would threaten the accuracy of convictions 
and jeopardize scant judicial resources.  Revisiting cases would com-
pel parties to “relitigate facts buried in the remote past through 
presentation of witnesses whose memories of the relevant events of-
ten have dimmed,” he wrote.311  It would also “seriously distort the 
very limited resources society has allocated to the criminal process 
[and] expend[] substantial quantities of the time and energies of 
judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity under 
present law of criminal convictions that were perfectly free from error 
when made final.”312 
Yet, “different conceptual, policy and practical considerations are 
implicated when a defendant seeks only review and reconsideration 
of his final sentence and does not challenge his underlying convic-
tion,” Doug Berman noted in a recent symposium issue devoted to 
the topic.313  Unlike trials, which require extensive resources and de-
 
ity to proscribe” because “there is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process 
to rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose”). 
310 This decisions are discussed in Part II.B, infra. 
311 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691. 
312 Id. 
313 See Douglas Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness and Finality for Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST 
J.L. & POL’Y 151, 165–76 (2014) (“Sentence finality, in short, has gone from being a non-
issue to being arguably one of the most important issues in modern American criminal 
justice systems.”); Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence:  Courts, Congress and Collat-
eral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 88–89 (2012) (noting the weakness of finality interests at 
stake compared to requests for sentence correction).  But see Ryan W. Scott, In Defense Of 
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pend on evidentiary preservation and presentation, sentencing is at 
least as prospective as it is retrospective.  The risks of inaccuracy, 
spoiled evidence, and procedural illegitimacy are simply not as great 
during re-sentencing as they are during retrial.  Trials also have dif-
ferent objectives than sentencing hearings.  While  trials “are de-
signed and seek only to determine the binary question of a defend-
ant’s legal guilt,” sentencing hearings “are structured to assess and 
prescribe a convicted offender’s future and fate.”314  Accuracy con-
cerns are even further diminished with mandatory sentences, because 
evidence was never presented at the original sentencing phase.  Re-
sentencing will be the first time the court considers a juvenile’s miti-
gating characteristics.  Moreover, reducing a sentence of incarcera-
tion may actually save resources that otherwise would have been spent 
on the operation of corrections systems. 
Take Quantel Lotts.  While conducting a new sentencing hearing 
for Lotts under Miller would likely require a court to consider mitigat-
ing evidence relating to his age, maturity, and life circumstances at 
the time of offense, much of the evidence would be gathered from 
existing documents—perhaps child protection documents regarding 
trauma history and family circumstances, medical records document-
ing his mental health history, schools records discussing his educa-
tional progress, trial records detailing the offense itself, and witness 
testimony about Lotts’ maturity, relationship with the victim and level 
of remorse.  The proceeding would plainly be less burdensome than 
retrying the case, and there would be far less emphasis on hard-to-
preserve items like forensics and ballistics.  Moreover, a significant 
portion of the proceeding would likely focus on Lotts’ recent institu-
tional history and current psychological profile as evidence of his 
“rehabilitation” and projected risk of recidivism. 
Nor would resentencing individuals like Quantel Lotts undermine 
the “deterrent effect” of criminal punishment, as the Teague Court 
warned.315  Unlike a reversed conviction, the reduction of an excessive 
sentence cannot reasonably be seen or described as a free-pass to 
would-be criminals.316  Moreover, as the Court observed in both Roper 
 
The Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 181 
(2014) (arguing in defense of the finality of criminal sentences on collateral review). 
314 Berman, supra note 313, at 167. 
315 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989). 
316 See Bator, supra note 199, at 452 n.21 (observing that the “certainty and immediacy of 
punishment are more critical elements than its severity”). 
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and Graham, juveniles, by virtue of their impulsivity an impetuosity, 
are less deterrable anyway.317 
Interests in finality may be even less compelling in the case of 
proportionality rules than they are with other sentencing rules.  No 
sentence of incarceration, after all, is ever really final until it has been 
fully served.318  Since the Court’s modern proportionality decisions 
have proscribed only the harshest sentences for the narrowest classes 
of individuals, such decisions are more likely to apply to active pris-
oners than decisions grounded in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments.  Those standing to benefit from the retroactive appli-
cation of new proportionality rules are, as a conceptual matter, the 
least likely to have final sentences. 
B.  Enhanced Justice Concerns 
By contrast, the risk of offending constitutional norms and un-
dermining fundamental notions of justice may be at their most pro-
nounced with new proportionality rules, because denying a second 
look to those whose sentences are “excessive” is to offend the consti-
tutional principles that underlie these rules.  This may explain why 
the Supreme Court and lower courts have afforded a broader reme-
dial scope to new proportionality rules than they have to new Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rules319 and suggests that 
proportionality rules merit a presumption of retroactivity. 
1. The Principle of Proportionality 
Like Atkins, Roper, and Graham before it, Miller is grounded in the 
Court’s proportionality jurisprudence, which holds that, by virtue of 
their reduced culpability, certain offenders (because of age, mental 
capacity or offense) are less deserving of the harshest punishments.320  
 
317 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–29 (2010) (noting juveniles “are less likely to 
take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions”); Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 511, 571 (2005) (noting that “juveniles will be less susceptible to deter-
rence”). 
318 Berman, supra note 314, at 167. 
319 This decisions are discussed in Part I.B, infra. 
320 Graham, 560 U.S. at 29, 31 (holding that life without parole sentences for non-homicide 
offenses committed by juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment); Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008) (holding that a death sentence is “not a proportion-
ate punishment” for raping a child); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (holding that a death sentence 
for juvenile offenders under age eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that a death sentence for a mentally-retarded of-
fender is “excessive,” thereby violating the Eighth Amendment). 
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Miller is, in other words, a proportionality rule.  It can be argued that 
new proportionality rules are retroactive by definition, because the 
continued imposition of the proscribed (or highly suspect) punish-
ment upon any member of that class, irrespective of when she was 
sentenced, would violate the Eighth Amendment (or create a serious 
risk of such a violation).  While those who oppose applying Miller ret-
roactively might argue that, because the Court did not ban juvenile 
life without parole outright, we cannot be sure that any of the 2,100 
inmates is serving a disproportionate sentence, the question then is 
whether our collective interest in the finality of these sentences 
should outweigh the constitutional risks of foreclosing the inquiry.  
In the wake of Atkins, would it be constitutionally tolerable for states 
to insist on executing mentally-impaired death row inmates on the 
grounds that Atkins did not proscribe capital punishment, but merely 
required states to impose a “process” to determine which offenders 
were “mentally retarded” enough to be spared?  It seems unlikely. 
This may, in part, explain the distinctions between those rules that 
the Court has deemed retroactive and those it has not.  Since Teague, 
the Court has considered the retroactivity of fourteen new rules of 
criminal procedure and has yet to find that any of them fall within ei-
ther of the Teague exceptions.  Eight of these new rules have involved 
the regulation of sentencing in some way; four of these were ground-
ed in the Eighth Amendment’s individualization and reliability re-
quirements,321 one in the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy 
Clause,322 two in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause,323and one in the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.324  
 
321 See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004) (holding that the new rule announced in 
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988), which held that capital sentencing schemes 
that require juries to disregard mitigating factors not unanimously found violate the 
Eighth Amendment, is not a watershed rule); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) 
(holding that a proposed new Eighth Amendment rule barring jury instructions that for-
bid a sentencing jury to consider mitigating evidence would not be watershed); Saffle v. 
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486 (1990) (holding that a new Eighth Amendment rule which for-
bids the trial court from “telling the jury to avoid any influence of sympathy” is not a wa-
tershed rule); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (holding that the new rule an-
nounced in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 474 U.S. 320, 328–29 (1985), which held that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a death sentence by a sentencer who “has 
been led to the false belief that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of 
the defendant’s capital sentence rests elsewhere” is not a watershed rule). 
322 See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 (1994) (holding that the application of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause to noncapital sentencing proceedings constituted a new rule that is 
not a watershed rule). 
323 See; O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997) (holding that the new rule an-
nounced in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 168–69 (1994), which held that a de-
fendant has a right arising under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to in-
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Five have been non-sentencing cases and have denied retroactive ap-
plication to rules rooted in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.325  In addition, though the Supreme Court has never itself ad-
dressed the retroactivity of the Apprendi-Booker-Blakely line of Sixth 
Amendment cases, several lower courts have and, with a few excep-
tions, have denied retroactivity.326 
Over the last twelve years, however, the Court has announced four 
new rules—the Atkins, Kennedy, Roper, and Graham rules—which have 
been deemed “substantive” and applied retroactively by lower courts.  
Each of these was a “proportionality rule.”  Although Atkins was de-
cided on direct appeal, courts have uniformly applied it retroactively 
to cases on collateral review because, according to lower courts, it an-
nounced a new, substantive categorical rule.327  Roper, which was on 
collateral review when it was decided, has been applied retroactively 
 
form a sentencing jury contemplating capital punishment that he is parole-ineligible and 
therefore not a future danger, is not a watershed rule); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 
170 (1996) (holding that the new rule arising under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause, which requires the state to give adequate notice of the evidence it intends 
to use in the sentencing phase, is not a watershed rule). 
324 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355, 358 (2004) (holding that the new rule an-
nounced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589, 609 (2002), which held that aggravating 
factors which make a defendant eligible for the death penalty must be proved to a jury ra-
ther than a judge under the Sixth Amendment, is not a watershed rule). 
325 Chaidez  v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (holding that the new rule announced 
in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), which held that the Sixth Amendment re-
quires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the deportation risks of guilty 
pleas, was not a watershed rule); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417–21 (2007) 
(holding that the rule announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which 
held that the Confrontation Clause bars the introduction into evidence of testimonial ev-
idence from a non-testifying defendant, is procedural and does not “qualify as a water-
shed” for Teague purposes because it “d[oes] not ‘alter our understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding’” (emphasis omitted)); 
Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that a new rule which gave a 
recaptured fugitive a right to appeal under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause is not a watershed rule); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993) (holding that the 
new rule announced in Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), which held that 
jury instructions that allowed murder convictions without consideration of a diminished 
mental state violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, is not a water-
shed rule); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (holding that the new rule an-
nounced in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), which held that the Fifth Amend-
ment bars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect’s request for counsel, is not 
watershed). 
326 See, e.g., U.S. v. Gentry, 432 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that U.S. v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005) does not apply retroactively). 
327 See, e.g., Simpson v. Norris, 490 F.3d 1029, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007); Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485 
F.3d 538, 540 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1172–73 (11th Cir. 2003); 
In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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for the same reason.328  Lower courts have also found that Graham ar-
ticulated a new, substantive rule which applies retroactively because it 
“bar[red] the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole on a juvenile offender.”329 
Surprisingly, the correlation between the constitutional roots of a 
rule and where on the substance/procedure spectrum it falls is some-
thing that only a few jurists and scholars have explored.  In an article 
published shortly after Teague was decided, Richard Fallon and Dan-
iel Meltzer alluded to the connection.330  Fallon and Meltzer argue 
that the Warren Court’s “new law” doctrine raises issues that are best 
resolved through a “constitutional remedies” framework, and apply 
this framework to some of the Warren Court’s most well known deci-
sions.331  A blanket bar to the application of new rules to cases on col-
lateral review is “too unbending,” they argue, and the inquiry should 
 
328 See Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1206, 1221, 1231 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting Roper 
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review as a case “prohibiting a certain category 
of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense” (quoting Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989))); Lee v. Smeal, 447 F. App’x 357, 359 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2011) (noting the seventeen-year-old appellant’s murder conviction was later commuted 
into two consecutive life sentences under Roper); Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 308 
(5th Cir. 2007) (noting the appellant’s pre-Roper death sentence was vacated on appeal); 
LeCroy v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
Florida Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s death sentence based on [Roper] because 
he was 17 years old at the time of his offenses.”); Sharikas v. Kelly, No. 
1:07CV537CMHTCB, 2008 WL 6626950, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 2008) (“Roper recognized 
a new constitutional right for juveniles sentenced to death prior to its issuance and that 
the ruling is retroactive on collateral review . . . .”); Holly v. Mississippi, No. 3:98CV53-D-
A, 2006 WL 763133 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2006) (vacating the petitioner’s death sentence 
based on the retroactive application of Roper); Little v. Dretke, 407 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823–
24 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“Roper is clearly substantive, rather than procedural, in nature.”); 
Baez Arroyo v. Dretke, 362 F. Supp. 2d 859, 883 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“Roper applies retroac-
tively to all cases involving offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, 
including those cases on collateral review . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Arroyo v. Quarterman, 222 
F. App’x 425 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Sims v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 731, 733 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (holding the rule in Roper, while retroactive, only applies to death 
sentences, not life imprisonment without the possibility of parole); Duncan v. State, 925 
So. 2d 245, 252 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (vacating the appellant’s death sentence pursuant 
to Roper). 
329 In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011); see also In re Evans, 449 Fed. App’x 284 
(4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (noting the government “properly acknowledged” Graham 
applies retroactively on collateral review); State v. Dyer, 77 So. 3d 928, 929 (La. 2011) 
(holding compliance with Graham required removal of the defendant’s parole eligibility 
restriction); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Iowa 2010) (holding Graham ap-
plies retroactively); Kleppinger v. State, 81 So. 3d 547, 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (ap-
plying Graham on collateral review); Manuel v. State, 48 So. 3d 94, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010) (vacating a sentence of life without parole on collateral review pursuant to Gra-
ham). 
330 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 169. 
331 Id. at 1733. 
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instead be able to “accommodate a variety of practical pressures.”332  
An inquiry into the “nature and purpose of the right” at stake is one 
appropriate metric for assessing a new rule’s remedial scope.333  “At 
one end [of the spectrum] lie rules and decisions that hold a defend-
ant’s conduct constitutionally immune from punishment,” while “at 
the other end of the spectrum stand rules whose purposes are sub-
stantially deterrent,” such as the “exclusionary rule.”334  The nature 
and purpose of the former “clearly calls for retroactive application 
even of surprising holdings,” while the “argument for retroactive ap-
plication” of the latter is “relatively weak.”335  “Occupying the “middle 
of the spectrum are rules that involve procedural protections, rather 
than constitutional immunities from prosecution.”336  Though not 
explicit, Fallon and Meltzer seemed to be distinguishing between 
proportionality rules, which should be applied retroactively, Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment rules, for which the argument was weak, and 
Sixth Amendment rules, which could go either way. 
2. Fundamental Unfairness 
In 2010, the Washington, D.C.-based Sentencing Project surveyed 
1,579 of the 2,500 juveniles serving life without parole in the United 
States.337  The results were predictable, but nonetheless, deeply sober-
ing.  Mirroring other statistical portraits of youth incarcerated in 
adult prisons, 77.3% were of color,338 and many reported childhoods 
that were marked by highly elevated levels of poverty, abuse, expo-
sure to community violence, familial incarceration, problems in 
school, engagement with delinquent peers, and were frequently 
raised in homes with few adult guardians—facts which, because many 
were waived to adult court without hearings, did not make their way 
into court proceedings.339  The report also revealed that over 60% of 
juvenile lifers were not participating in rehabilitation programming 
in prison340 largely because of restrictions placed by corrections sys-
tems.341 
 
332 Id. at 1807. 
333 Id. at 1808. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 169, at 1808. 
337 Nellis, supra note 55, at 2. 
338 Id. at 8. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. at 23. 
341 Id. 
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As the Court has repeatedly acknowledged, allowing one petition-
er to be the “‘chance beneficiary’ of a new rule” while denying that 
benefit to others based upon nothing more than an accident of tim-
ing results in “actual inequity.”342  That is precisely what happens in a 
non-retroactivity regime.  It is conceivable that two defendants con-
victed of the same crime on the same day might have entirely differ-
ent prospects for release if the direct appeal process for one was suf-
ficiently delayed. 
The inherent inequity is even more pronounced with proportion-
ality rules whose historical function has been, in part, to serve as a 
check on states’ propensity to overreact in times of moral panic.343  
The majority of mandatory life without parole statutes were enacted 
during the “get tough” era of the 1990s—a period that, in the words 
of one scholar, “witnessed the broadest and most sustained legislative 
crackdown ever on serious offenses committed by youth within the 
jurisdictional ages of American Juvenile Courts.”344  Lawmakers on 
both sides of the political spectrum are now rethinking the policies of 
the “get tough” era.  To refuse to take a second look at these sen-
tences is to, in essence, proclaim these 2,100 individuals be to the un-
fortunate casualties of an era of extreme punitiveness.  In the words 
of Erwin Chemerinsky, “It would be terribly unfair to have individuals 
imprisoned for life without any chance of parole based on the acci-
dent of the timing of the trial.”345 
CONCLUSION 
With its decision in December 2014 to grant certiorari in Toca v. 
Louisiana, the Supreme Court signaled that it wants to resolve the is-
sue of Miller’s retroactivity in the near term.  Given all that Miller has 
already done to redefine the sentencing of juveniles convicted of 
homicide in this country—altering the range of sentencing outcomes 
 
342 Id. (emphasis original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 (1982); 
see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (citing Desist v. United States, 394 
U.S. 244, 258–59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (conceding that the “[s]elective applica-
tion” of new rules of criminal procedure necessarily “violates the principle of treating sim-
ilarly situated defendants the same”). 
343 Stinneford, supra note 69, at 907 (noting that the historical focus was not on punishments 
that were ‘“cruel and rare” but on those that are “cruel and new,” which suggests “the 
core purpose of the Clause is to protect criminal offenders when the government’s desire 
to inflict pain has become temporarily and unjustly enflamed, whether this desire is 
caused by political or racial animus or moral panic in the face of a perceived crisis”). 
344 Franklin Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice:  Notes from an Ideological Battleground, 
11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260 (1999). 
345 See Chemerinsky, supra note 31. 
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that over half the states may impose upon them, changing the facts 
that these states must now consider before sentencing them, signifi-
cantly narrowing the class of juvenile homicide offenders who are 
likely to receive sentences of life without parole, and eliminating sen-
tences of mandatory life without parole for juveniles in their entire-
ty—it is hard to imagine how the Court could deem Miller anything 
but a “substantive” rule.  That Miller is, in most respects, a classic pro-
portionality rule only bolsters this conclusion, because denying relief 
to those, like Quantel Lotts, whose sentences are, at the very least, 
likely to be disproportionate is to undermine the very principles of 
proportionality on which such rules rest. 
Understandably, the question of Miller’s retroactivity has preoccu-
pied jurists, advocates, and scholars for the last two and a half years.  
Once this question is resolved, however, attention will move to Mil-
ler’s mandates.  If juveniles can no longer be sentenced “as though 
they are not children,”346 what then will become of the forty-year min-
imums established by states like North Carolina and Texas in Miller’s 
wake?  These lengthy fixed term sentences will likely become the next 
frontier for those challenging the proportionality of juvenile pun-
ishment.  As this happens, the ideological pendulum will continue to 
swing back toward the original purpose of the juvenile court, and, in 
doing so, bring this country more fully in line with the rest of the 
western world. The United States is also among just 16% of countries 
worldwide that try to sentence children as adults, a practice that many 
countries flatly ban,347 and remains the only country in the world to 
sentence a juvenile to life without parole in practice.348  In fact, the 
majority of countries prescribe sentences for juvenile offenders to a 
maximum of twenty-five years.349  And while international treaties re-
quire that countries have a minimum age of criminal liability, thirty-
three states in the United States have no such requirement at all.350  
Indeed, the vast majority of countries have long recognized that “kids 
are different.”  As our scientific understanding of adolescent differ-
ence becomes even more refined, “substantive” mandates about the 
minimum age of culpability, adult transfer, and the limits of adoles-
cent sentencing under the Eighth Amendment are sure to emerge.  
 
346 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012). 
347 See Cruel and Unusual:  U.S. Sentencing Practices in a Global Context, UNIVERSITY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, CTR. FOR L. AND GLOBAL JUST. 59 (May 2012) (noting that eight countries 
have been identified as having laws that could allow for a sentence of juvenile life without 
parole, but there are no known cases of the sentence being imposed). 
348 Id. at 55–56. 
349 Id. at 58. 
350 Id. at 49. 
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And with these mandates will come the inevitable questions about 
whether they apply retroactively. 
